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THE SUM OF ITS PARTS:
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Jeremy R. McClane
A question often posed of the legal profession is what (if any) value lawyers
add to the endeavors of their clients. However, this framing of the question
ignores the fact that lawyers do not add value in a vacuum, but only through
effective collaboration with their clients. This Article therefore addresses the
question of lawyers' value by examining the working relationship between a
lawyer and his or her client. As a lens I analyze one of the most important
types of capital markets deals in a company’s existence: its initial public
offering (IPO) of company stock. Drawing on data from interviews with
equity capital markets lawyers at major law firms, and analyzing data from
IPOs in the United States registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission between June 1996 and December 2010, this study finds a
strong association between several measures of IPO performance and the
familiarity between the lead underwriter and its counsel, as measured by the
number of times a particular law firm serves as counsel to a managing
underwriter within a relatively short time period. Performance is gauged
according to a stock’s opening day returns, price performance over thirty,
sixty, and ninety trading days, correct price revision, litigation rates, and the
speed at which deals are completed. I also analyze the relationships between
the lawyers for the lead underwriter and the lawyers for the issuer. The
analysis shows some benefits from familiarity, albeit generally smaller than
those associated with the underwriter-lawyer relationship. In all cases, the
positive effects of repeated interaction diminish the further back in time the
previous collaborations occurred. I also show that the relationships between
familiarity and deal quality occur independently of the level of the lawyers’
experience.
These findings support the conclusion that lawyers’ relational skill can
positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of substance and
process knowledge. I hypothesize that the core advantage of repeated
interaction is the formation of more effective lawyer-client team dynamics.
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INTRODUCTION
To what extent does familiarity among lawyers, and between lawyers and
their clients, impact the outcome of a deal, even independently of the
lawyers’ expertise? The question is significant given that clients frequently
choose their counsel based, at least in part, on relationships and past
experiences with counsel.1 The question is also important as part of the
ongoing discussion of what value lawyers add for clients generally.2 In a
1. See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Team, Firms and Lawyers: Evidence of the
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1028–
30 (2011) (finding that in-house legal counsel rely on relationships and prior experience with
law firms when selecting counsel).
2. For one of the more famous articulations of, and answers to, that question, see Ronald
J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation].
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transactional setting, as in many others, lawyers do not perform their work in
isolation, but in concert with clients and other parties who shepherd
transactions to completion.3 The output of a transaction is a collective work
product, and therefore, an inquiry of what value lawyers add cannot be
disentangled from an inquiry of what value can be created through effective
working relationships amongst lawyers and clients.4 And while many would
agree that there are intangible benefits from familiarity, it is not obvious that
lawyers’ relationships with clients or other counsel would add any
quantifiable value to the handling of a matter. Indeed, familiarity might just
as easily destroy value if it causes lawyers to take a client relationship for
granted, makes a law firm difficult to fire because of interpersonal concerns,
or interferes with counsel’s ability to make objective judgments about the
client’s issues.
This Article reports the initial findings of a research program to study the
working relationships between lawyers and their clients, as well as lawyers
and their opposing counsel, in the transactional setting. The study focuses
on a particular type of transaction—the initial public offering (IPO) of a
company’s stock—and draws upon data from interviews with equity capital
markets practitioners who work on such deals, as well as publicly available
data on deal performance.
The results provide evidence that the quality of the working relationship
between a lawyer and his or her client, as well as relationships between a
lawyer and the counsel on the other side of the transaction, have a significant
positive impact on deal performance in the context of IPOs. The study adds
to the literature about the nature of lawyers’ relationships with their clients5
and is the first to provide quantitative evidence of the benefits a good working
relationship can yield in a transactional setting.
To provide this evidence, I analyze the impact of repeated collaborations
between managing underwriters and the various legal counsel they employ
in the IPO process, as a proxy of better working relationships. I also analyze
the impact of repeated interactions between different sets of counsel on IPO
transactions within a relatively short period. I find a strong association
between the number of times a particular law firm and bank work together
3. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings,
Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995) (describing
a theory of IPO transactions in which lawyers act as one part of a larger endeavor by bankers,
accountants, and other parties to produce information).
4. See Jon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Discipline of Teams, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 111, 112 (describing team outputs as “a collective work-product
reflect[ing] the joint, real contribution of team members”).
5. See, e.g., Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1000 (reporting the results of a survey of
corporate in-house counsel finding that large companies keep a stable of preferred law firms
to provide services; that relationships are important to selection of counsel; and that clients
focus on teams and departments, as well as entire firms and individuals, in choosing firms);
David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2010) (arguing that the relationship between
corporate counsel and corporate clients resembles a strategic alliance or partnership more than
an agency relationship).
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within the preceding one, two, and three years and better deal outcomes, as
gauged by a stock’s opening day returns and price performance over thirty,
sixty, and ninety trading days, as well as the time to completion of each deal.
The impact on stock performance decreases the further back in time
successive lawyer-client interactions go. To rule out selection, I perform an
analysis using smaller samples of only the most prestigious and experienced
banks and perform other tests on subsets of the data that exclude observations
that could plausibly be the product of selection. I also show that frequent
interaction between lawyers and their clients is associated with deals that are
more accurately priced (as indicated by increasingly faster deal completion
from the filing date of the preliminary prospectus). In addition, I show that
relational effects as proxied by repeated interactions impact deal outcomes
independently of the experience of the lawyers involved.
These findings provide evidence that lawyers’ familiarity and relational
skill can positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of their level
of experience with regard to substantive legal expertise. I hypothesize that
the core advantage of repeated interaction is the generation of trust and
familiarity, leading to more effective lawyer-client team dynamics. That
explanation is consistent with research on teams indicating that repeated
interaction among team members fosters lower error rates and better team
outputs,6 as well as the accounts of practicing lawyers gleaned from
interviews. The basic conclusion to which the literature points is that
frequent collaboration is a product of frequent interaction, and groups who
collaborate form better teams. Better teamwork in turn produces overall
better performance in the negotiation of capital markets transactions, leading
to better information product, more efficient allocation of marketing efforts,
and ultimately better stock performance. The broader implication of this for
transactional lawyers seeking to leverage their skills more effectively is that
the model of lawyer-client relationship in transactions should be reimagined
to reflect less the dynamics of principal and agent and more the dynamics of
a team.
This research brings a previously unexplored perspective to the study of
securities law and transactional lawyering. To date, despite a large body of
research on IPO transactions7 and the role of lawyers in deal making,8 no
studies have sought to explore the impact of collaboration on IPO deals.
6. See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON
SMALL GROUPS 245, 250 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (discussing research on teams
indicating that repeated team interactions lead to lower rates of error, among other things).
7. See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 275–355 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing
the voluminous empirical finance literature on IPOs).
8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers As Transaction Cost Engineers, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 508–14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers]; Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at
240–44; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1995) [hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Business
Lawyers].
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Scholarship in the past several decades has supported the idea that
cooperation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society
as a whole, and much research has focused on finding ways to foster it in the
legal profession.9 However, implications of this for the quality of working
relationships between the various parties involved in a group production
process like an IPO have not been explored.10
Because the goal is to explore individuals’ interactions, and by extension
the familiarity among the lawyers and bankers conducting deals, I limit the
time frames to the one year, two years, and three years preceding each deal.
I gather data from interviews with professionals in law firms, investment
banks, and institutional investment firms to understand their perceptions of
the impact of familiarity and to supplement the statistical analysis by
unpacking the causal mechanisms and meanings that the numbers do not
reveal. I examine a number of outcome-related variables for which data is
available, including price performance, informational completeness
(evidenced by disclosure), probability of securities litigation, length of time
from the initiation of the deal to the offering date, and decimal versus integer
pricing (an indicator of a well negotiated final price). I control for a number
of other factors that affect performance commonly employed in the literature
on IPOs. Appendix Figure A sets out the variables analyzed and standard
controls used.
Figure 1 below represents the relationship present in the raw data between
the IPO stock’s performance on the first day of trading (the first day
“bounce”) and the number of times in the preceding year an underwriter has
collaborated with its counsel, as well as the number of times the two sets of
law firms involved in the deal have encountered each other working on an
IPO. As Figure 1 illustrates, repeated interactions bear a linear relationship
to an incrementally increasing opening day bounce. The pattern remains in

9. See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents
Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 331–33 (1997)
(examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in improving
cooperation); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550 (1994)
[hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents]; see also James K.L. Lawrence,
Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 431, 431–35 (2002) (discussing the professionalization of collaborative lawyering
approaches). The type of cooperation that these studies deal with is distinct from teamwork,
as it is used in this Article. Cooperation, as used in other research, refers to the lawyers on
opposite sides of litigation revealing information and working to come to a swift resolution
for their clients. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra, at 550. Teamwork
includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing the working relationships between all
parties, including the lawyers, clients, and other outside experts, largely subsuming
adversarialism in pursuit of a common goal.
10. Cf. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used in team
production belong to one person”).
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regression analyses controlling for factors that may also influence the first
day bounce, as detailed below.
The trend in first day bounce has mixed implications but is generally a
positive result for the underwriter and its counsel. A large first day price
increase indicates that the stock was priced at a level lower than what the
market would bear, at least in the short term. Because underwriters are
typically compensated by commission (usually around 7 percent) on the
gross proceeds of the offering at its initial price, the large first day bounce
appears at first blush to represent money that the underwriter leaves on the
table.11 However, underpriced IPOs are a ubiquitous phenomenon, and it is
widely believed that a moderate first day bounce indicates a successful
transaction.12 This is because a healthy first day bounce purportedly
generates publicity for the offering, attracts investor interest, and allays the
possibility of an undersubscribed offering.13 For these reasons, underwriters
are reported to underprice IPOs intentionally by approximately 10 to 15
percent of the stock’s expected market value once it is fully distributed.14
Figure 1: Repeated Counsel Interactions and First Day Bounce

11. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 590–
99 (2004).
12. See generally Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation,
and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Tim Loughran
& Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2004,
at 5, 5–37; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57
J. FIN. 1795 (2002). See also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why
Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 18–22 (1993) (describing
underpricing and critiquing litigation avoidance theories for it); James C. Spindler, IPO
Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working
Paper
No.
94,
2009),
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=usclwps-lewps (analyzing
explanations of underpricing). For a review of the finance literature discussing underpricing,
see generally Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 375–422 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing
the literature on underpricing).
13. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 599–618 (explaining the potential benefits for
underwriters and issuers of a significant first day price increase).
14. Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a certain level of underpricing intentionally,
typically around 15 percent of the stock’s expected equilibrium trading price. The purpose of
the underpricing is reported to be ensuring strong demand and mitigating the impact of hedge
funds and other investors “flipping” the stock in the market. For example, sealed documents
from the eToys litigation made public in early 2013 feature a Goldman Sachs pitchbook stating
that an IPO should be priced at a “10-15% discount to the expected fully distributed trading
level [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1-3 months after the offering.” Joe
Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs: The Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/nocera-goldman-sachsetoys.html (publishing sealed documents from the case eToys Inc. ex rel. Post Effective Date
Committee v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 02/601805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)).
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Even though a high first day bounce—indicating high levels of
underpricing—represents a significant loss of money to the underwriter
because it results in lower commissions, underwriters can garner significant
value from underpriced offerings through trading commissions and future
services from preferred clients.15 Therefore, whether the result shown in

15. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810 (explaining underpricing as a form of
compensation to investors for past business and inducement for future business: “[i]f
underwriters are given discretion in share allocations, the discretion will not automatically be
used in the best interests of the issuing firm. Underwriters might intentionally leave more
money on the table than [sic] necessary, and then allocate these shares to favored buy-side
clients. There is some evidence that underpriced share allocations have been used by
underwriters to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid pro quos . . . to curry favor with the
executives of other prospective IPO issuers in a practice known as “spinning” . . . or even to
influence politicians”) (citations omitted); see also Nocera, supra note 14 (disclosing
documents indicating that the underwriter profited through various kinds of reciprocal investor
paybacks). As one commentator has illustrated:
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients were sitting on
a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock started trading on the open market.
In most cases, the clients cashed out—which was smart, because eToys didn’t stay
at those levels for long. But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits in trading
commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions, compared to that $11.5
million in fees.
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-really-make-money-on-ipos/.
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Figure 1 represents excessive underpricing or not, it indicates an increasingly
positive deal outcome for the underwriter.
This result, as well as others, is further elaborated below. All
specifications in the empirical model include controls for each industry, each
year, and other confounds, and all of the results are significant at the 10
percent level, with the majority significant at the 5 percent level using
clustered robust standard errors, with results significant at the 10 percent
level. It should be noted that the quantitative and qualitative empirical
methods used in this Article each have their limits, as will be further
discussed. Nonetheless, the results survive numerous tests for robustness as
well as tests for selection. Moreover, the results are consistent with existing
theory, other empirical literature, and practitioner understanding of IPO
deals, such that they provide very strong support for this Article’s
conclusions.
Part I of this Article describes the IPO process, generally, and the roles of
the relevant parties, in particular the lawyers. This part also reviews the
literature relevant to counsels’ role in IPO transactions. Part II develops
testable hypotheses about the impact of repeated interactions. Part III
describes the data and methodology and statistical results of the hypothesis
testing. Part III also explains the assumptions employed in the study and the
limitations of the methodology. Lastly, Part III discusses the normative and
policy implications of the results.
I. IPO PRICING AND THE LAWYERS’ ROLE
IN TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT
Before delving into the analysis of lawyer-client interactions, it is useful
to discuss the prevailing theory about how lawyers add value in transactions
and what specific features of a lawyer’s work in IPOs align with that theory.
One of the first actions taken by both underwriters and issuing companies
about to go public is to appoint legal counsel to assist in the process.16 The
lawyers are essential to the transaction from the very beginning.17 Lawyers
can influence the outcome of a capital markets transaction in any number of
ways, but the most obvious mechanisms at work in IPOs are the lawyer’s
ability to influence the information available to the market via disclosure and
the lawyer’s ability to reduce transaction costs (including regulatory costs).
These mechanisms were famously articulated in Professor Ronald Gilson’s
description of the lawyer as “transaction cost engineer.”18 The “transaction

16. Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27
VILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1981) (discussing the importance of the issuing company’s advisors,
including its counsel, when beginning an IPO).
17. See id.
18. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 255 (arguing that lawyers add value in
transactions by “devising efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset
pricing theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of
effecting transactions in this world”); see also Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers, supra note
8, at 508–14; Gilson & Mnookin, Business Lawyers, supra note 8, at 2–4.
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cost engineer” description starts by accepting the validity of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), which provides a theoretical basis for calculating
the rate of return on a given asset, given the asset’s risk characteristics.19 The
“transaction cost engineer” explanation of lawyering posits that lawyers
contribute to better deals through services that cause financial products or
transactions to conform to the assumptions underlying the CAPM.20 In the
context of financial instruments, this means that lawyers help to create
products whose risk and return profiles are conveyed accurately and
comprehensibly to participants in the markets, such that the market can
efficiently value such products. In the following sections, I describe the tasks
that lawyers perform in IPOs that fit the “transaction cost engineer”
description, and I explain how these tasks are the product of collaboration
with clients as well as other sets of lawyers, as opposed to individual efforts
by any particular set of counsel.
A. Lawyers and Information Production in IPOs
An IPO is a company’s introduction to the public markets, and therefore
gathering and disseminating information about the issuing company and its
prospects is one of the most important components of the transaction. It
follows that one means by which lawyers can influence the performance of
an IPO is through their central role producing information about the issuing
company.
1. The Role of Lawyers and Their Clients in Producing Information
From the outset of the IPO process, the lawyers for the underwriters and
the lawyers for the issuing company will play an important role in creating
the information product that will be used to price and market the issuing
company’s stock.21 This task will first involve a due diligence review, in
which the lawyers and the underwriter thoroughly investigate the issuing
company’s business.22 During the due diligence review, the attorneys will
gather and verify information for the prospectus, which in turn helps to

19. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory
and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2004, at 25, 25–30 (describing the capital asset
pricing model and research on its validity). The model provides a means of estimating the
non-diversifiable risk of an asset—the risk that cannot be offset by including the asset in a
diversified portfolio. The risk corresponds to the return an investor should expect on the asset
to compensate for that risk. Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–62 n.41 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2003).
20. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 254.
21. See Utset, supra note 3, at 277 (describing the lawyers’ job in an IPO to be the
production of an information bundle).
22. See Royce de Rohan Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel As Gatekeeper or
Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP.
MKTS L.J. 164, 167 (2007).
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manage liability risk from material omissions and misstatements.23 Typical
legal due diligence often includes a review of material contracts, related party
transactions, cross default provisions, negative pledge agreements, and rights
of third parties to terminate contracts.24 Due diligence requires involvement
of the issuing company, which gathers the relevant information for the
lawyers to review. It also necessarily involves the underwriters, who may
raise questions or ask for verification on particular matters during the
process.25
While due diligence progresses, the lawyers for both the issuer and the
underwriters are heavily involved in drafting the prospectus, which is the
main document through which the newly issued securities will be
marketed.26 The prospectus is usually drafted iteratively in meetings
involving both sets of counsel and their clients and through a series of
exchanged drafts.27 Counsel for the issuer typically takes the lead in drafting
the prospectus and thus has a large amount of control over the draft,28 but the
underwriter’s counsel has significant impact as well.29 The issuing
company’s management, as well as representatives from the underwriter,
provides input throughout the process, as each has a direct interest in how the
document is drafted.30 The underwriter often plays a large role by providing
precedent documents at the outset of the transaction, thus setting the template
from which the deal documentation draws.31
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations specify the
information that must be disclosed32 and also require that the prospectus
disclosure not be misleading.33 Moreover, the prospectus must not contain

23. See id.; see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 4–5.
24. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 167 (explaining the details of the lawyers’
involvement in the IPO process).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (“This drafting is an iterative process, as knowledge gained in due diligence
informs what needs to be said about the issuer.”).
28. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in preparing the
registration statement is normally the attorney for the company. Company counsel is
principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of the registration statement.”).
29. See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the company, the
underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”).
30. See id. at 14, 18.
31. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
32. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.915 (2014). Required disclosure includes:
(1) information about the company’s business, see §§ 229.101–229.103; (2) the management’s
discussion and analysis of financial condition of the company, including future projections if
desired, see § 229.303; (3) financial statements and an auditor’s opinion covering them, see §
210; (4) a description of material contracts, see §§ 229.10–229.915; (5) information about
legal and regulatory problems facing the company, see § 229.103; (6) information about the
officers and directors of the company and their compensation, see §§ 229.403–405; and (7)
certain industry specific information, see generally SEC, INDUSTRY GUIDES,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf.
33. See § 230.408.
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any material misstatements or omissions,34 with “material” defined as
“matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered.”35 Applying the materiality standard requires legal analysis and
judgment, and lawyers play a significant role deciding what is necessary to
disclose.36 Nonetheless, the prospectus is a marketing document as well as
a regulatory one, and the underwriter typically has requirements of its own
that make the prospectus a more effective tool for marketing purposes.37
Additionally, the issuing company usually takes a strong interest in how its
story is told.38 Thus, the drafting process requires collaboration between all
the parties and requires counsel to work closely with each other and with both
sets of clients.
The due diligence process continues throughout the drafting of the
prospectus, even after the filing of a preliminary prospectus with the SEC,
which is required prior to marketing the deal.39 The SEC’s review of the
preliminary prospectus typically involves several rounds of comments and
requests for clarifications, additions, or alterations to the disclosure, each of
which must be addressed.40 During the time that the SEC is reviewing the
preliminary prospectus, the underwriter and issuer’s management are
engaged in marketing efforts.41 The lead underwriter and issuer’s
management market the stock by visiting institutional investors in various
cities and presenting the company’s story as set out in the preliminary
prospectus.42 Through this process, known as a “dog and pony show,” the
underwriter assesses the demand for the stock by building a book of orders
from interested investors.43 Because the Securities Act prohibits public

34. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405.
36. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (reviewing the process by which lawyers
negotiate and draft the prospectus disclosure and concluding that it is a “process . . . involving
the exercise of judgment”).
37. See id.; Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14.
38. Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14, 18.
39. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, Strategic Disclosure and the Pricing of
Initial
Public
Offerings
2
(Mar.
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://server1.tepper.cmu.edu/Seminars/docs/hanley_hoberg_March.pdf.
40. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 45–50 (discussing the SEC comment and review
process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65, 70–72 (1996) (describing the SEC staff’s role in the
registration and disclosure process).
41. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 22 (noting that the “red herrings” are distributed
after filing and while the SEC reviews the filing).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 22–23; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION 115, 122–25 (11th ed. 2009) (describing the road show and bookbuilding
process); Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168–69 (describing the development of an offering
price and using the initial filing range as a proxy for the estimate developed during the “beauty
contest”).
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offers or sales of the stock, investor orders cannot be binding.44 Moreover,
information given to the investors during the road show must conform to
what is contained in the preliminary prospectus.45
When the marketing effort is complete, the lead underwriter negotiates
with the issuing company’s management to set a final price for the stock
based largely on the investor demand ascertained during the road show.46
Once the final price is negotiated, a final version of the prospectus and final
pricing information are deemed effective by the SEC.47 The shares are then
sold to the investors at the final price, and the company goes public.48
Throughout this process, the lawyers for both the issuer and the
underwriter play a key role verifying and synthesizing historical information
and producing new information that may be needed by offering a legal
interpretation of key issues in the deal.49 In addition, counsel are often
responsible for helping to produce accurate information about possible future
performance by working with the accountants to ensure that earnings
projections and discussions of planned activities are appropriately balanced
and match the financial statements in the prospectus.50 Counsel also play a
key role in determining how the information will be presented, which in turn
influences how clearly the information is conveyed to investors and

44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 114 (“Sales
are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also cannot accept customers’ oral offers to buy.
But the underwriters can ‘build their book,’ collecting non-binding indications of interest from
customers, which they hope to convert into sales once the registration statement is declared
effective.”).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (prohibiting material misstatements and omissions in
connection with the sale or offer of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for
documents containing materially false or misleading information); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 43, at 123–25 (discussing disclosures to investors during road show presentations).
46. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is not a
definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the stock to the public
until after the preliminary marketing process is complete, some time after a preliminary
prospectus has been circulated. SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus for
an IPO circulated prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently
stated as a range, at which the stock will be sold. This price estimate may change in subsequent
preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires information during the
marketing process.”).
47. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.424(b), 230.430A (2014); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note
43, at 128–29. Before the promulgation of Rule 430A, the underwriters were required to file
pricing information in the form of an amendment to the registration statement before the SEC
declared the registration statement effective. See id. Under Rule 430A, the registration
statement can be declared effective before the filing of pricing-related information as long as
a complete final prospectus is filed shortly thereafter. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A.
48. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129.
49. For example, counsel typically give formal legal opinions regarding the issuer and the
stock being issued, as well as interpret legal matters such as tax and litigation consequences.
See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18 (“In addition, company counsel normally renders a
formal opinion on the legality of the securities being registered, which is filed as an exhibit to
the registration statement. In connection with a common stock offering, the opinion would
state that the shares being offered are legally issued, fully paid, and non-assessable.”).
50. See id.
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analysts.51 All of these activities require significant input from clients and
therefore benefit from good working relationships between counsel and
clients, as well as a good understanding by counsel of what clients’ interests
are in each stage of the process. The ultimate product has an impact on the
performance of the deal, as discussed in the next section.
2. The Role of Information in Transactional Outcomes
In theory, the information product that lawyers work with their clients to
produce impacts the extent to which investors can accurately assess the risk
and return profiles of issuing companies, and therefore should impact the
performance of a company’s stock, at least in the short- and medium-term.
The theoretical impact of disclosure on price is supported by empirical work
that has studied the connection between the two.52
Empirical studies have generally found a connection between rough
measures of disclosure quality and the market’s reception of an IPO stock.53
Disclosure quality has been proxied in these studies in terms of volume,54
proportion of the prospectus,55 and level of ambiguity.56 These studies
indicate that certain types of disclosure bear significant relationships to price
performance of the issued securities in the market. The studies indicate that
risk factor disclosure—described as a negative or ambiguous disclosure—
has been found to bear a positive association with underpricing.57 In other
words, risk factor disclosure is related to a large price increase of the stock
on the first day of trading, which means that the offering price was lower than
the market uptake of the stock would have predicted, at least in the shortterm. By contrast, greater levels of neutral or positive disclosure (i.e.,
everything outside of the risk factors) have been found to correspond to less
underpricing.58 More particularly, certain sections of the prospectus
containing important information, specifically the Management Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A), the Prospectus Summary, and Use of Proceeds

51. See id. at 18–19.
52. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–93 (1999) (surveying
available empirical studies on the impact of mandatory disclosure).
53. See, e.g., Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and
Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1497, 1497–1500 (2010) [hereinafter Arnold et al.,
Effects of Ambiguous Information]; Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The
Information Content of IPO Prospectuses, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2821–23 (2010);
Spindler, supra note 12, at 1–5; Tom Arnold et al., Measuring Risk Disclosure in IPOs and Its
Effect on Initial and Subsequent Returns (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228419565_Measuring_Risk_Disclosure_in_IPOs_
and_its_Effect_on_Initial_and_Subsequent_Returns.
54. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9.
55. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–40; see also Spindler, supra note 12, at
9–10 (using ratio of risk factors to prospectus summary as a proxy for overall proportion of
positive to negative disclosure).
56. Arnold et al., Effects of Ambiguous Information, supra note 53, at 1497.
57. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9–19.
58. See id. at 16–19.
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sections, have been found to correspond to lower levels of underpricing.59
Taken together, these studies indicate that positive information leads to more
accurate pricing, while ambiguous or negative information leads to less
accurate pricing and more money left on the table by the issuing company.60
This also results in lower commissions for the underwriter, but as explained
below, the underwriter may garner benefits from this phenomenon that more
than offset any loss. These studies are relevant to the lawyers’ role in the
transaction and in the securities law scheme more generally, because both
sets of lawyers provide substantial input into the disclosure. The lawyers
produce information for the prospectus and verify its content through due
diligence, make legal judgments about the extent of information necessary to
include in the prospectus, review the prospectus for accuracy, and negotiate
its content with each other and with the SEC via rounds of comment and
response. Ultimately, each set of counsel must sign off on the disclosure
document. Therefore, to the extent disclosure has an impact on material
outcomes of the deal, such as price accuracy and stability over time, the
lawyers’ role in creating the prospectus is significant.
B. Lawyers and Transaction Costs in IPOs
Transaction cost engineering also involves minimizing transaction costs
that unnecessarily reduce the value of a financial product, while bearing no
inherent relationship to the financial product’s expected risk or return.61
Transaction costs create inefficiencies in the deal making process, causing it
to become more difficult or costly than it would be if conducted in a
hypothetical perfect market.62 These costs can arise from numerous sources:
time, expense, regulatory costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs,
inefficient communication, irrational or strategic behavior, and
externalities.63 Lack of information, risk, and uncertainty also create
transaction costs, although in a different way than described in the preceding
section. With respect to transaction costs, risk, uncertainty, and lack of
information affect a transaction because they disable complete contracting
or, as often happens, create obstacles that can cause a deal to break down
even when it should make economic sense.64
59. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34. I have located no study that has
been able to confirm a causal relationship between disclosure and underpricing, and several
have noted that it may be the result of underlying uncertainty. As explained below, this Article
provides previously unavailable evidence of causation through instrumental variable
regression.
60. See id. at 2857–61.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 21–28 (1995)
(describing how transaction costs affect firm size and choices); Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–56
(1981) (discussing different types of transaction costs and their effects on asset allocation).
63. See generally HART, supra note 62; Williamson, supra note 62.
64. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (explaining how transaction costs lead to
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Lawyers can minimize transaction costs in a number of ways, and good
working relationships with clients are important to all of them. Lawyers may
reduce costly inefficiencies by helping parties avoid and resolve potentially
costly disputes that could needlessly prevent valuable deal making.65
Lawyers can contribute to reducing transaction costs by helping coordinate
the different parties involved and ensuring that all parties have a proper
understanding of the tasks to be completed at each stage of the deal.66
Expertise with respect to the IPO process is important for accomplishing this
end, but relational skill is perhaps more important because it facilitates
efficient interactions between the parties.67 This can, in turn, reduce
transaction costs by facilitating faster deal completion and establishing
processes that require less work on the part of clients, who can then focus
their energies on other aspects of the deal. Greater time efficiency can reduce
unwanted deal delays and allow the underwriter to control the timing of the
deal to ensure the best performance.
Familiarity of the underwriter’s counsel with the underwriter—both
through relationships with the underwriter’s personnel and through
knowledge of its institutional practices—might also reduce agency costs.
Although agency costs are a distinct concept from transaction costs, agency
costs—stemming from the divergence between information and interests of
the principal and the agent—can lead to inefficiencies that can be categorized
as a form of transaction cost as well. The better a lawyer knows his or her
client’s preferences, the less time and energy are needed for the client to
transfer information to the agent, and the lower the likelihood that the lawyer
will erroneously represent the client’s interest. The more familiar the lawyer
and the client become, the more trust they develop, and the less effort the
client has to put forth to monitor the lawyer. Moreover, the more familiar a
lawyer is with the underwriters’ ideal outcomes, the more they would be able
to advocate for the underwriters’ interests, with less delay and lower danger
of miscommunication. This may have ripple effects that carry through to the
execution of the deal.

contract incompleteness, which in turn is a barrier to deal completion); Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57–89 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle
eds., 1990).
65. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 254; Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers,
supra note 8, at 509. Professors Gilson and Mnookin expand upon this model by explaining
that skilled lawyers help their clients by negotiating value-creating exchanges, capitalizing on
economies of scale and scope, and managing inherent tensions between value creation and
distribution. See Gilson & Mnookin, Business Lawyers, supra note 8, at 9–12.
66. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 19 (describing the importance of coordination
between the lawyers and other parties and the importance of having a common understanding
of the deal structure).
67. See id.
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Finally, a lawyer’s substantive expertise can reduce regulatory costs, a
subset of transaction costs.68 In this model, lawyers add value by advising
clients on ways to avoid costly government regulations. This might take the
form of avoiding direct costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on how
to minimize taxation, or it might involve less direct, but no less significant
costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on the most favorable
jurisdiction and/or form in which to incorporate to reduce legal uncertainty,
or avoid litigation.69 In the IPO context, counsel may assist in managing
regulatory costs by advising on the issuer’s legal organization and capital
structure prior to the commencement of the deal.70 Counsel also liaise with
the SEC and other regulators, and the lawyers’ ability to handle issues that
the regulators bring up can have an impact on the timing and efficiency of
the deal.71
C. Lawyers As Reputational Intermediaries
Another possible source of value of transactional lawyers is the role of
lawyers as reputational intermediaries.72 Reputational intermediaries convey
important information to the market about the quality of a transaction.73 This
model suggests that lawyers (as well as other professionals involved in the
deal) add value by providing a signal of quality in the underlying
transaction.74 This model is not exclusive of the “transaction costs
engineers” model; in fact, a lawyer’s reputation may itself derive from the
ability to reduce transaction costs in the way that Gilson and others describe.
68. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500–02 (2006) (reporting the results of a survey in in-house legal counsel
on the value of transactional lawyers).
69. See id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law (Harvard Law
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper 337, 2002),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=harvard_olin (describing the
market for corporate law, as evidenced by choices of jurisdiction of incorporation that most
reduces costs related to legal uncertainty and use of familiar default rules).
70. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19.
71. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the process of dealing with SEC comment and deficiency
letters).
72. See Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century:
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 17, 46–48 (2003); see also Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers,
74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995) (proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational
intermediaries). The impact of lawyer expertise has been examined in the mergers and
acquisitions context. See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and
Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189–99 (2013).
73. See generally Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public
Offerings, 64 ACCT. REV. 693 (1989); Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12; Richard Carter & Steven
Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1053 (1990);
Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run
Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285–290 (1998).
74. See Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 596 (1996); see also Okamato, supra note 72, at 18
(“The suggestion here is that service as a reputational intermediary is a defining aspect of
lawyers’ work.”).
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Nonetheless, the reputational intermediary model encompasses more than the
lawyer’s substantive ability to do a deal. The model includes the possibility
that because of reputational concerns, lawyers will screen transactions before
agreeing to take on the work, and therefore the mere fact of a lawyer’s
participation in a deal is a signal of quality.75
In the context of IPOs specifically, theories have been advanced that the
reputation of the underwriter,76 auditor,77 and underwriter’s counsel78 might
all convey information to investors beyond what is contained in the
prospectus and affect the price of the IPO stock. Empirical tests of these
theories have demonstrated a relationship between lead underwriter
reputation and lower levels of underpricing, indicating more accurate pricing
of the offering.79 This has been explained as a function of the incentives of
high reputation underwriters in preserving their reputations through more
accurate pricing. A similar relationship has been demonstrated with regard
to auditors.80 However, studies of lawyers’ reputations have had mixed
results: one study found a negative relationship between market share of
legal counsel and IPO underpricing.81 Other studies have found that lawyers’
reputations, when measured by market share, do not impact price.82 This
makes sense to the extent that the identity of the lawyers rarely plays a role
in investors’ decision making.83 However, as explained further in subsequent
sections, the reputation of legal counsel alone is unlikely to play a large role
in the performance of deals, as indicated by the quantitative and qualitative
results discussed below.
D. Repeated Interaction and Selection of Counsel
Apart from lawyer reputation, lawyers’ ability to add value in the ways
just described might all be affected by their familiarity with the clients whom
they represent. Even reputation, though not directly impacted by familiarity
with clients, might be related to lawyers’ ability to cultivate and maintain
client relationships. One way to assess whether good working relationships
have any impact on deals is to look at the repeated interactions between
lawyers and clients. Repeated interactions provide a useful proxy for better
75. See id.
76. See e.g., Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12, at 213; Carter et al., supra note 73, at 285.
77. See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 73, at 693.
78. See, e.g., Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 166.
79. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2853–55. But see Patch Paczkowski & Majdi
Anwar Quttainah, Law Firm Prestige As a Signal of Value for Initial Public Offerings (June
19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2087695. For further
discussion of this theory, see generally Franklin Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by
Underpricing in the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 303 (1989).
80. See generally Beatty, supra note 73.
81. See Royce de R. Barondes & Gary C. Sanger, Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing
16–21
(May
4,
2000)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227729.
82. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 575–95.
83. Telephone Interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
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lawyer-client relationships because they build familiarity and trust, establish
common understanding, and facilitate communication.84
As previously noted, my research has not revealed other studies of the
impact of lawyers’ relational skill in the transactional setting. However,
empirical studies of lawyer relationships in other contexts shed some light on
what results might be expected, and a number of instructive studies have
looked at lawyers as repeat players. One noteworthy study demonstrated that
iterative relations significantly promote collaboration between lawyers on
opposite sides of a case in the litigation context.85 Another empirical study
tested repeated interactions among litigators and concluded that frequent
contact helps lawyers to learn about each other’s strategies, build
relationships, and foster concern for reputation.86 The study concluded that
repeated interactions increase cooperation between lawyers negotiating a
settlement, as the different sides learn how best to deal with each other.87 It
is possible that the dynamics at work for repeated meetings among litigators
would hold true for repeated meetings between lawyers and clients in the
transactional setting as well.
The empirical literature on teams adds support to the hypothesis that
repeated interaction fosters trust and better teamwork. A number of studies
provide evidence that frequent interaction leads to the creation of group
norms, shared understanding of the tasks to be completed, and routinized
processes.88 These processes further allow each member of the team to
leverage individual expertise more effectively and in concert with other team
members. Experimental evidence suggests that when team members are
replaced by newer members of a team, some of these gains are lost as the
team and the new member adjust to a new group dynamic.89 This further
suggests that frequent collaboration engenders benefits to a group endeavor
that cannot be easily replicated by other means.

84. See Steve W. J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work
Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006).
85. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 9, at 534–64
(discussing the impact of iterative interactions on litigators); see also Croson & Mnookin,
supra note 9, at 340–45.
86. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 46, 59–60 (2002).
87. See id. at 40–48 (outlining mechanisms by which better results are obtained through
repeated interactions); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–50 (stating gametheoretic bases for increased cooperation over time).
88. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“[R]epeated interactions among
individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such that shared
structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process interactions. Process
begets structure, which in turn guides process.”); see also, Schneider et al., supra note 16, at
17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a common understanding of the
tasks to be accomplished).
89. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86. In one interesting experiment, teams
were assembled to create origami birds. Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task
together multiple times, but lost efficiency when members of the existing team were replaced
with new members. See id.
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Empirical studies of the relationships between lawyers and their clients
suggest that clients value familiarity.90 Large corporate clients such as
investment banks frequently choose from among a panel of lawyers, all of
whom are of high quality.91 But recent empirical work indicates that
selection of counsel is based on more than quality of counsel and fee structure
as traditionally assumed; relationships with lawyers and teams of lawyers
within each firm exert a strong influence on which law firms are selected to
act for a client.92 Similarly, lawyers in the equity capital markets space
emphasize the importance of interpersonal relationships with clients as a
major factor that helps them to get repeat business.93 Thus, there are
indications that familiarity and relationships are valuable to clients as well as
lawyers.
Nonetheless, familiarity and repeated interaction might not necessarily
lead to measurably better outcomes. First, even if there are intangible
benefits from familiarity, they may not translate into any quantifiable results
in terms of deal performance. The various individuals who are party to the
deal might enjoy the experience more, and feel it is more efficient, but this
may or may not translate into, for example, better disclosure, or better
marketing. Second, familiarity does not necessarily lead to better quality of
interaction in every instance. Some research suggests that working together
repeatedly may not lead to better collaboration if team processes are not well
thought out.94 Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine that familiarity might
make counsel less able to be objective, either for fear of offending the client
or from loss of perspective after spending too much time taking the client’s
point of view. Alternatively, familiarity might cause lawyers to take the
relationship for granted and therefore devote fewer resources to the client. In
the same vein, interpersonal considerations or overreliance might make it
difficult for a client to fire its counsel, thus allowing counsel to shirk. I turn
now to a discussion of the data to explain which way it cuts.

90. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1003.
91. See id.
92. See id. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 357–68 (1985) (advancing a model of lawyer selection based
on relationship to a firm and firm-specific capital rather than interpersonal relationships
among individuals).
93. Some banks have preferred firms. For example, Morgan Stanley is known to work
with Davis Polk & Wardell regularly on equity capital markets deals. Similarly, Goldman
Sachs is known to work frequently with Sullivan & Cromwell. Several of the lawyers in these
firms have such close relationships with bank personnel that they participate in business
related decisions, and their capital markets partners become involved in the marketing side of
IPOs. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
94. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50.
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Repeated Interactions and IPO Deal Outcomes
In this section, I describe the data and empirical analysis that support the
implications of the theoretical discussion above. First, I describe the
impressions of team dynamics taken from interviews with practicing lawyers.
I then explain the quantitative analysis, drawing from an original dataset of
IPOs and examining the repeated interactions between banks and law firms
that handle the transactions.
1. Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics
Practitioner accounts are useful for understanding how lawyers and their
clients perceive the impact of team dynamics on deals outcomes. The
lawyers interviewed for this study routinely listed familiarity and trust as key
hallmarks of IPO deals that they experience as successful. Often they cite
past experience working with their clients as an important precursor for
familiarity and trust.95 Moreover, better deals result when all the parties
working on the deal seem to have a common vision of how the deal should
be done.96 While there are certain similarities between deals, each
underwriter leading a deal has idiosyncratic institutional priorities, and the
people within the underwriting banks have their own preferences.97 Lawyers
frequently report that understanding those preferences from the outset of the
deal helps to facilitate the entire process.98 The lawyers on the deal come to
understand their client organizations’ operations,99 including the key
personnel to contact to accomplish the range of tasks necessary to move the
deal along.100 In addition, lawyers develop an understanding of the
communication norms inside an investment bank,101 as well as the
institutional preferences with regard to how to negotiate the deal.102 This
understanding of how the client operates supplements an enhanced
understanding of the client’s institutional interests, as well as the preferences

95. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request)
(on file with author).
96. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
97. See id.
98. There was a consensus among lawyer interviews that this was the case. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on file with
author).
99. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
100. Id.
101. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author). As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “[i]t gets easier
the more times you work together. I know exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something.
Or who to prod if something needs to get done.” Id.
102. Telephone Interview with Attorney 2 (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
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of individuals in the client organization.103 The result, in theory, is better
coordination of agents with their principals in the performance of their tasks.
In addition, information disparities are less a source of agency costs because
the lawyer-agent has less need to spend time gathering information about the
client’s interests and can negotiate more forcefully on the client’s behalf.
Futher, when lawyers and clients work together frequently, they develop
greater mutual trust, assuming previous deals have gone well. Trust allows
clients to feel less need to monitor their lawyer-agents, freeing the client to
focus on marketing and other commercial aspects of the deal.104 Indeed,
some lawyer-client relationships involve such a high degree of trust and
familiarity that lawyers become involved in helping their clients to think
through business strategy in addition to providing legal advice.105 The
overall impression is that frequent collaboration leads to trust, that each
member of the deal team can focus on his or her job better, and that the team
produces better work, more quickly.
If familiarity creates trust and efficiency, lack of familiarity can create the
opposite. When describing deals that did not go well, lawyers recall working
with other counsel who do not seem to know the norms of how deals should
be done.106 These deals typically involve issuer’s counsel that either lack
experience in IPOs, or resolutely refuse to trust underwriters. In such
situations, there is often a lack of trust and an adversarial attitude toward the
underwriter and its counsel. In such cases, lawyers for issuing companies
reportedly fight over issues that most seasoned participants in IPO deals
would think are unimportant, and when the issuing company’s management
makes unreasonable demands, the issuer’s lawyers refuse to counsel their
clients on commonly accepted industry practices.107
On the client side, personnel in investment banks who work with lawyers
describe poor deals as those in which the lawyers do not seem to know what
they are doing and in which the bankers have to explain every step. The deals
are marked by a lack of trust in the bank’s counsel and the need to recheck
and sometimes redo work that the lawyers have done.108

103. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. For example, one
in-house lawyer taking his company public recounts that during negotiations, the
underwriter’s counsel, who worked frequently with the underwriters on such deals, regularly
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not agree to, without any need to
confer with anyone from the bank’s team. See Interview with Attorney (June 19, 2013) (name
withheld by request) (on file with author).
104. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013), supra note 99 (recounting that
some partners in some law firms understand their industry so well that they actually are able
to advise on the help with the commercial side of the a capital markets deal).
105. Id.
106. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
107. See id. Experienced attorneys are reportedly better able to counsel issuing company
management against making exaggerated statements or falling out of step with standard
practices. See also, Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14.
108. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2014), supra note 99.
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2. Quantitative Analysis
The basis for the quantitative analysis below is the observation that
lawyers working on IPOs frequently represent the same underwriter and the
same teams within an underwriting bank. Moreover, lawyers representing
underwriters will often meet the same sets of counsel representing issuers
from deal to deal.109 While it is difficult to observe interpersonal interactions
with enough regularity to assess their systematic impacts, a meaningful proxy
of these interactions is the frequency with which an investment bank
managing a deal and the lawyers serving as the bank’s counsel work
together.110 Although I do not observe the individuals inside the investment
banks themselves, it is reasonable to infer that many of the same individuals
would be involved in deals done within a short time frame if the deals are
done out of the same office, in the same location, and within a particular
industry. Accounting for those factors, the membership of the teams within
banks and firms reportedly remains stable over relatively short periods of
time.111
I examine repeated interactions by looking at the number of IPO deals
completed in the preceding one year, two years, and three years involving:
(1) the same underwriter’s counsel and lead underwriter(s) and (2) the same
sets of counsel. In theory, if repeated interaction improves relationships
between a lawyer and his or her client, it might have positive benefits for a
lawyer’s effectiveness, coordination, and communication in furtherance of
the client’s interests. In addition, relationships across the table can help to
facilitate the deal. With respect to uncertainty and risk, better coordination
could help produce more complete and easily digested disclosure, thus
reducing uncertainty in the market and allowing investors to confidently
calculate risk. Coordination might help in this regard because both sets of
lawyers and the underwriter would have a shared understanding of the type
of information to unearth in the due diligence process and how best to present
it in the prospectus to tell the appropriate story to the market.112 This would
in turn translate into more accurate pricing and better performance in the

109. Between 1996 and 2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across the
table from one another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2265 total
deals. Between 1996 and 2010, there were also 406 instances in which issuer’s counsel had
acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previous year. On 206 of
those occasions, the issuer’s counsel also had worked across the table from the lead
underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total of 2265 deals. Between those
same years, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that had worked across the table from one
another in an IPO deal at least three times within the preceding two years.
110. As an additional robustness check, names of individual attorneys for each deal were
collected and matched to each transaction. The result shows a significant effect, with a
stronger magnitude. These results, as well as others, will be reported in a future study.
111. This was corroborated by interviews. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney
(Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
112. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the importance of close
coordination among members of the deal team).
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market. Stronger market performance, coupled with better disclosure, should
produce less IPO-related litigation, all else being equal.
B. Analysis of the Data
The following discussion explains the quantitative analysis and result of
this study in detail. The data analyzed below comes from a number of public
sources. The starting point for data collection on IPOs in the United States
is the Kenney-Patton IPO Database.113 This dataset contains information for
2287 de novo IPOs between 1996 and 2010.114 Each IPO was cross-checked
with the Thompson ONE deal record to confirm the date, ticker, and issuer
name.115 From the Thompson ONE database I also pull information on the
underwriting syndicate, including the names of the bookrunners or joint
bookrunners, managers’ and issuer’s counsel, and the age of the issuing
company. The dealsheet also includes the initial price range filed with the
SEC as well as the stock opening price, which I use to determine whether the
opening price was revised up or down from the initial range. To find
measures of each stock’s performance over time, I use information from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.116 In particular, I
look at the opening day closing price relative to the offering price; the price
change at thirty, sixty, and ninety days and one year; and the volatility over
thirty, sixty, and ninety days. In addition, from the SEC’s EDGAR database,
I gather the offering prospectuses from each IPO and cull from these the total
word counts, as well as the word counts for each section of the prospectus
including the prospectus summary, the risk factors, and the management’s
discussion and analysis section.117 The word counts disregard information
contained in tables and charts. This methodology is used in other research
on IPOs on the rationale that pure word counts, while constituting a very
rough estimate of the types of disclosure included, do not suffer from the
potential bias associated with hand-coded disclosure elements.118

113. For more information on the database, see Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Guide to
the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
from
1990
Through
2010,
U.C.
Davis
(2013),
http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/faculty/webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf.
114. The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of preferred
stock, and spin-offs.
115. THOMPSON ONE DATABASE, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/toolsapplications/trading-investment-tools/thomson-one-investment-researchtools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiAx4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt
6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9oMbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Aug. 20, 2015).
116. CRSP
U.S. STOCK DATABASES,
http://www.crsp.com/products/researchproducts/crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
117. U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Aug.
20, 2015).
118. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9 (noting the this method “has the advantage of being
objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of particular disclosures (such as
coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and does not require subjective index
weighting”). Word counts for my study were taken for a total of 2258 prospectuses. A small
number (seven) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the database.
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Information on class action litigation was taken from the Stanford Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse.119
Twenty-two records were dropped because information could not be found
on the issue in the Thompson ONE database or because the CRSP database
did not contain information on the share price. The resulting dataset has 2265
IPOs spanning fifteen years. The identities of each IPO’s managing
underwriter or underwriters are taken from this data set. A bank is considered
a managing underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a joint
bookrunner.120 The identities of the underwriter’s counsel and issuer’s
counsel are similarly determined from this data.121
The offer date is used to construct variables of how often a certain
underwriter-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together in the
previous one year, two years, and three years for each new issue. For
example, Goldman Sachs was a manager of Goodman Global’s IPO on April
5, 2006, and their counsel was Cahill Gordon & Reindel. This was the third
time the pair had worked together in a year, as they had also worked together
on Horizon Lines Inc.’s September 26, 2005 IPO and New Skies Satellites
May 9, 2005 IPO. Prior to that, they had not worked together since they
teamed up for Equinix, Inc.’s August 10, 2000 IPO. Time periods beyond
three years are not examined given the likelihood of lower rates of overlap
between teams working together on transactions after such long time periods.
With respect to the recurring deal in which the same counsel represents an
underwriter, or in which the same law firms meet on opposite sides of the
deal, I analyze a number of quantifiable deal outcomes: price performance,
the incidence of price correction before offering date, the incidence of
litigation, the length of time to complete a transaction, and the occurrence of
non-integer pricing (as a signal of a more heavily negotiated price). These
performance measures are readily quantifiable and offer strong indications
of how well the parties to the deal have performed once other relevant factors
are controlled for.
With respect to price performance, for purposes of investigating the extent
to which frequency of interaction matters, I employ Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression analysis122 using the stock price increase during the first
119. STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu (last
visited Aug. 20, 2015).
120. The most frequent lead underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154),
Morgan Stanley (137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122). Bank mergers are
treated as the “death” of each of the merging banks and the “birth” of the merged bank. To
give an illustrative example, “Credit Suisse,” “First Boston,” and “Credit Suisse First Boston”
are treated as three different firms.
121. The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (176),
Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath, Swaine & Moore (111),
and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106). As with investment banks, law firm
mergers are treated as the death of each old firm and the birth of a new firm. In the rare cases
of multiple firms representing management, the two firms are treated as a single unit for that
transaction.
122. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to find a function that approximately fits a
set of data; i.e., it attempts to determine the relationship between a set of explanatory variables
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day of trading (Appendix Table 1) and the price change after thirty, sixty,
and ninety days of trading, relative to the performance of the S&P Index to
account for the effect of market movements (Appendix Table 2). With
respect to the probability of price correction (Appendix Table 3) as well as
class action litigation (Appendix Table 4), I employ a probit regression
analysis.123 For upward price revision, I estimate the change in probability
that the parties to the deal will correctly raise the offering price from the top
of the initial filing range for deals that perform well in the market. With
respect to litigation, I estimate the change in probability that a securities class
action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months and the first year after the
IPO offer date.
In addition to these variables, I use a number of other independent
variables to ensure a generalizable result, in line with prior empirical
literature on IPOs.124 These variables include: (1) dummy variables for the
IPO year, (2) the industry category of the issuer (as determined according to
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code) to control for different market
conditions over time and in various industries, (3) each investment bank in
order to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with each lead
underwriter, as well as (4) the interaction of these variables.125 In addition,
for all specifications, I control for the IPO size measured in terms of the gross
proceeds of the offering, a variable frequently used as a proxy for deal
quality.126
I perform each analysis using a number of alternative specifications to test
the robustness of the model. Appendix Tables 7 and 8 report the results for

and an outcome variable of interest. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (MIT Press 2010).
123. A probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probability of an event occurring, versus the
probability of the event not occurring. See id. at 566–67.
124. See e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; see also Eckbo et al., supra
note 7, at 276–79.
125. Dummy variables provide a method of controlling for variation within certain
categories of variables by removing the mean of the observations for the dependent variable
of interest. For example, in an OLS regression using first day price jump (i.e., underpricing)
as the dependent variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used. This allows for
variation in overall underpricing from year to year, by removing the mean underpricing for
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that particular
year. So if, for example, 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large amount of underpricing,
the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average underpricing and leave only the
variation attributable to other factors. The same is done for each IPO quarter, each lead
underwriter, each industry, and the interaction of each industry and year. See WOOLDRIDGE,
supra note 122, at 307–10.
126. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; Eckbo et al., supra note 7, at 276–
79. Regressions use the natural log of gross proceeds to mitigate skewness in the distribution
of dollar amounts. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33. In the alternative
specifications in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, I also use the size of the company (measured by
total assets) and the book value per share as alternatives ways to control for deal quality.
Regressions using total assets yield coefficients similar to those using the log of gross
proceeds, indicating that the latter is a good proxy for the size of the issuing company.
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analysis of the first day price increase and the probability of litigation under
the alternative specifications.
C. Main Results
This section illustrated some of the basic relationships in the raw data. The
figures below show that repeated bank-lawyer interactions in the past year
are associated with a greater opening day price jump, as well as greater price
performance after the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days (relative to
the S&P 500 Index).
Figure 2: Repeated Interactions and Price Performance
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These graphs show that issues where the lead underwriting bank and
counsel have worked together repeatedly tend to exhibit superior price
performance (as well as underpricing) at incrementally higher levels. Of
course, this is merely descriptive, and there are many confounds that also
affect these performance measures. To attempt to investigate if this
relationship is real, I turn to OLS regression analysis controlling for factors
that influence market performance.
1. Price Performance Regression Analysis
The first performance measure analyzed is the opening day price jump.
Panel A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a strong and
significant effect from increased bank-counsel interactions, even after
controlling very flexibly for year, industry, and bank fixed effects.
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The first two specifications look at the number of bank-counsel
interactions within a year of the IPO, with and without bank fixed effects.
The subsequent columns look at the number of interactions in the preceding
two and three year periods. In all cases, the marginal effect of an additional
interaction is positive and statistically significant. There are two notable
trends across these specifications: the value of a marginal interaction
decreases as the time horizon increases, and the effect survives the
introduction of bank fixed effects to control for quality concerns or bank
idiosyncrasies.
The next set of performance measures to be examined is the percentage
price change over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of days to control
for the effect of overall market returns. The controls in all cases are dummies
for the IPO year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.127
Robust standard errors are used for each regression.128
Panel A of Appendix Table 2 shows the results for the thirty, sixty, and
ninety-day price performance measures.
Deals involving frequent
collaborators are associated with strong market performance over the first
ninety days, as measured by price relative to the S&P 500 Index. The effect
of each additional interaction on the relative change in a stock’s price relative
to the S&P Index after thirty trading days is 4.4 percent when the lawyerunderwriter collaborations occur within the past year. The marginal
performance price increase drops to 2.8 percent when the lawyer-bank
collaborations are spread over the past three years. Correspondingly, fewer
recent interactions between a bank and a law firm are strongly associated
with lower price performance over the same periods. The effect remains for
the first ninety days of trading, for which each deal in the past year is
associated with a 7.5 percent increase, declining to a 4.1 percent increase in
relative price for deals within the preceding three years.
From the regression analysis, it appears that frequency of interaction bears
a strong positive correlation with stock performance. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that teams of lawyers and bankers working together repeatedly
and over a short period of time are able to improve deal outcomes, leading to
a positive impact on the price of a stock. However, these outcomes may also
indicate overly high levels of underpricing, especially because the price
increase is sustained over the long term. In addition, selection is a particular
concern with respect to the underwriter and its counsel because managing
underwriters might be likely to pick the same law firms repeatedly to do the
best performing deals. In order to rule out selection and tease apart positive
relational impacts from negative ones, I perform further tests below.
127. Additional controls such as the syndicate size were not significant and so were not
reported.
128. To eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to industry, bank, and year, each
regression was run using cluster robust standard errors on those dimensions with no change in
the significance of the results. See A. Colin Cameron et al., Robust Inference with Multiway
Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238, 238–49 (2011).
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2. Selection
A concern with respect to interactions between the underwriters and their
counsel is the possibility that the results above are selection driven. After all,
underwriters select their counsel, and we might be concerned that their
selection criteria are related somehow to the outcomes analyzed above. If
that is the case, then the underwriter’s selection of counsel could be tied to
the quality of the issuer and the quality of the transaction as a whole, and
metrics such as price performance might simply be a result of the same
underlying considerations that led to the appointment of a particular law firm.
Therefore, the quality of the deal drives both the result and the selection of
counsel. For instance, if Goldman Sachs wins the lead underwriting spot in
a “hot” IPO, it may select its most preferred counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell,
to act as counsel on the deal, and because the deal is “hot,” it may generate
better market performance and/or more underpricing.
The most compelling argument against this possible selection story is that
the underwriter selects its counsel before due diligence takes place and before
the bookbuilding process begins, meaning that the worrisome early selection
takes place well before the bank is in a position to know how a particular
issue will perform in the market. One might nonetheless observe that an
underwriter can have a good sense of what sort of price performance an issue
will yield in advance of the bookbuilding itself—after all, the underwriter has
to come up with a proposed price range when making its pitch to the issuer
in the first place.
Even taking this fact into account, however, the incremental nature of the
results (i.e., that each additional interaction is associated with an incremental
increase in price performance on average) makes the selection story above
unlikely. That is the case because in order for selection to be driving the
results, it would have to be true that lead underwriters can accurately and
systematically predict the level of underpricing and market price
performance (as well as time to completion and litigation outcomes as further
discussed below) and choose different legal counsel a specific number of
times based on the precise predictions for each deal. That scenario is
extremely unlikely.129
Nonetheless, further analysis of the data is useful to provide evidence that
selection is unlikely to be driving the observed effects. I do this by cutting
the data to isolate observations that might plausibly be the product of
selection. As previously described, the most obvious selection story is that
investment banks managing high performing IPOs are more likely to choose
particular counsel repeatedly. If this were the case, it would also produce a
pattern in which repeated bank-counsel interactions are associated with
incrementally better market performance, as seen above. To determine
whether this selection story is supported by the data, I observe that a

129. See, e.g., Telephone interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by
request) (on file with author).
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relatively small group of investment banks typically leads the “hot” IPOs.
The banks that tend to get these deals are the ones that have the greatest
amount of IPO experience.130 I continue by limiting the sample to those
banks, creating smaller subgroups consisting of those banks that serve as lead
underwriter in at least forty issues in the dataset (the top eighteen banks) and
to those that manage at least eighty issues in the dataset (the top seven
banks).131 If the main results are selection driven, they should disappear in
the limited samples, because those samples contain most of the “hot” IPOs,
and any significant variation due to the quality of the underwriter or the
quality of the deal should flatten out. But as Appendix Table 9 shows, the
results remain even in these limited samples. I conduct the same analysis
using dollar market share in the year preceding any given deal as a measure
of bank quality, instead of the number of deals in the dataset, and the results
remain. To further rule out the possible impact of selection, I perform the
same regressions after removing all deals in which the bank employs its
“favorite” law firms. I determine a bank’s “favorite” law firms in two
different ways. First, I remove the deals involving law firms with which
banks have done the greatest number of deals within the preceding one, two,
and three years. Second, I remove deals involving lawyer-underwriter pairs
that are reported in interviews to be favored lawyer-client relationships in
equity capital markets. If selection is driving the main results, and banks are
simply picking their favored law firms for the best deals, then the results
should disappear when the deals involving favored law firms are removed.
However, the results remain. Finally, I create a variable for the experience
level of each law firm to see if selection based on expertise might be driving
the results. The results remain when controlling for IPO experience of each
firm. Moreover, when the number of deals a firm has done in the past over
the last one, two, and three years is used as the dependent variable in
regressions, instead of the interactions between firms and investment banks,
the effect does disappear. This further indicates that the interaction between
lawyers and their clients impacts the deal beyond the lawyers’ experience
alone. These results, along with other robustness checks, are reported in
Appendix Tables 7 and 8.

130. See id. In addition, prior to entering academia, I spent several years as an associate in
the capital markets department of a major international law firm, where I worked on IPOs as
well as other types of transactions.
131. I note that the proxy used here for quality is different than that used in some other
studies. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34 (using dollar market share for the
previous year as a measure of underwriter quality). However, for present purposes, the
number of deals works as well or better than other measures because it more directly relates
to the potential selection problem inherent in repeated interactions with counsel. Nonetheless,
as a test for robustness, I tested the more commonly employed measure of quality (dollar
market share for the preceding year). The results remained.
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3. Performance Versus Excessive Underpricing
Another issue which complicates the interpretation of the data is that first
day price performance, or underpricing, has both good and bad
interpretations for deal quality. A very large opening day bounce can be
viewed not as an indicator of better stock performance, but rather as evidence
of pricing error on the part of underwriter and poor service provided to the
issuing company.132 However, as previously discussed, an IPO can be
considered a success for an underwriter even where underpricing is high,
because underwriters are able to capture value through trading commissions
on the IPO stock (the trading of which tends to increase the more underpriced
the stock is), as well as quid pro quo business from favored investors who
receive allocations of the underpriced stock and profit from the rise in its
price.133 In order to better understand how to interpret first day price increase
and the effect of repeated interactions, it is necessary to parse the
underpricing puzzle more finely.
Understanding the implications of underpricing for the relationship
between the underwriter and its counsel requires a brief detour into the vast
economic literature on underpricing. Numerous theoretical explanations for
underpricing have been advanced, and a few that are especially relevant to
the analysis here are worth noting.134 One such explanation is that the
underpricing serves as a compensation mechanism for investment banks’
favored institutional clients, who often bear risk by agreeing to purchase
shares in IPO issuers.135 The banks need these investors to ensure adequate
demand for stock in certain offerings, including offerings in which the risk
of return is uncertain. Banks compensate these clients for agreeing to
purchase such stock (and thus ensure adequate demand for the offering) by
giving an essentially guaranteed margin of return through the underpricing.
Another possible explanation is that underpricing is a form of insurance
against the risk of liability, as a stock that performs well relative to its
offering price is much less frequently the subject of litigation than those
which perform poorly.136 Regardless of the explanation, the phenomenon is
132. See generally Alexander, supra note 12 (discussing a theory of underpricing as an
artifact of error, combined with abundance of caution).
133. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 591–92.
134. Most of the theoretical explanations come from finance literature. See generally James
R. Booth & Richard L. Smith III, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986); Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15
J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986); Seha M. Tiniç, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common
Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988). However, the legal literature has addressed the issue as well. See,
e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 17–22; Yoram Barzel et al., Prevention Is Better than Cure:
The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition, 79 J. BUS. 2911, 2911–13
(2006); Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 16–21; Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling
Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 649–51 (2007); Spindler,
supra note 12, at 15–16.
135. See generally Murat M. Binay et al., The Role of Underwriter-Investor Relationships
in the IPO Process, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 785 (2007).
136. See Tiniç, supra note 134, at 789–95, 803–15 (explaining the liability theory and
testing it empirically).
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generally seen as a transfer of value from the issuing company, which
receives a lower price for the stock than it otherwise could, to the initial
investors (and indirectly the investment banks), who realize the gain. Thus,
while underpricing might be necessary, the issuer would seek to keep it at a
minimum, where the underwriter would seek to maximize it in the pricing
negotiation.
Most relevantly, various studies have investigated whether different
attributes of the major players in the IPO process are related to the level of
underpricing. A number of studies have found an association between
greater underwriter reputation and lower levels of underpricing.137 At the
same time, one prominent study found the opposite to be true, particularly in
offerings of smaller issuers.138 Another set of studies examined IPO auditors,
finding that greater auditor reputation and level of compensation were
strongly associated with lower levels of underpricing.139 Of those, a few
have looked at the relationship of counsel in the deal and the existence and/or
degree of underpricing.
Studies of the relationship between legal counsel and underpricing have
presented a mixed picture. One study examined the relationship of the
issuer’s counsel’s reputation, measured by level of compensation, and found
a correlation between counsel with a good reputation and lower levels of
underpricing.140 The explanation for this is thought to be either that better
counsel help the issuer to be more aggressive in its negotiations and advocate
for more positive disclosure in the prospectus, or that they provide quality
assurance to the underwriters, or both.141 Another study examined the impact
on underpricing of the experience level of underwriter’s counsel, using a law
firm’s market share within its particular geographic area to determine
experience level.142 This study found a strong negative correlation between
the experience level of the manager’s counsel and the level of upward price
adjustment from the initial offering range. Those authors theorize that this
effect is the result of more experienced counsel’s ability to require more
negative disclosure about an issuer in the preliminary and final prospectus,
because this disclosure is the primary basis for the bank’s marketing efforts,
which in turn affects the final price.143 These authors cite previous studies

137. See, e.g., Carter & Manaster, supra note 73, at 1046; Barondes & Sanger, supra note
81, at 16–21.
138. See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 12, at 11–12, 30–31.
139. See Beatty, supra note 73, at 693–709; Randolph P. Beatty, The Economic
Determinants of Auditor Compensation in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 31 J. ACCT.
RES. 294, 294–300 (1993).
140. Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 561, 596. For a study on the relationship between
IPO market share by bank and announcement of an investigation by the SEC, see generally
Beatty et al., The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters, 50 J.
FIN. ECON. 151 (1998).
141. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 595–97.
142. See Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 2–3, 19–21.
143. See id.

MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX

2015]

10/4/2015 11:48 AM

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN IPOs

133

showing upward price adjustment as correlated with underpricing to
conclude that high-experience law firms help to create less underpricing.144
In order to separate what might be considered positive implications of
underpricing from negative ones, as well as to isolate the impact of
familiarity among the parties, it is necessary to analyze (1) what elements of
the first day bounce data would be consistent with a deal that performs well
and inconsistent with pricing error or agency problems between the
underwriter and issuer, and (2) whether either of the above can be explained
by experience or quality of the lawyers or underwriters, as opposed to factors
related to the interactions between the lawyers and bankers. The following
sections perform this analysis, revealing both inconsistencies with the
underpricing explanation and strong indications of a well-performing deal.
a. Upward Price Correction
To test whether the first day bounce is more consistent with good
performance versus error or lack of independence, I look at the propensity
for accurate upward price revision between the initial offer range and the
offering price in the presence of high levels of underpricing, when lawyers
and managing underwriters have worked together more frequently. A greater
propensity for correct price revision linked to counsel’s interaction with the
underwriter would indicate lower error rates, and possibly greater
independence on the part of counsel, because the underwriter typically
prefers to keep the price down and benefits less from revising up.145
To examine this, I first construct two measures of strong performers, or
companies whose stock price after thirty trading days is at least 20 percent
and 30 percent higher, respectively, than the midpoint of their filing price
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during the same
thirty days). The reason for doing this is to find issuances that clearly exceed
the level of underpricing for new issues that would be intended and
advertised by a typical underwriter (usually 15 to 20 percent) and therefore
should presumably have had an upward price revision if the price is to remain
at 15 to 20 percent below the “correct” level. I then calculate the probability
of an upward price revision occurring before the deal closes for those deals
in which the bank and counsel have worked together frequently and for those
deals in which the bank and counsel have not worked together frequently.
For this analysis, banks and counsel are considered to have worked together
frequently if they have worked together at least three times in the preceding
two years. If the first day bounce associated with repeated interactions is the
result of greater error rates, or an intentional scheme to price at a low level,

144. See id.; see also Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231–36 (1993).
145. A possible contrary interpretation would be that repeated interactions cause the
underwriter to be less effective when negotiating the price with the issuer. However, as
explained below in the discussion of integer versus decimal pricing, this interpretation is
unlikely.
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one should expect the probability of an upward revision to be lower when the
bank and counsel have worked together more frequently. However, the
analysis shows the opposite. Figure 3 shows these probabilities in the raw
data.
Figure 3: Upward Price Revisions

As Figure 3 shows, there is greater propensity for upward price correction,
and efforts to reduce underpricing, when banks and their lawyers are frequent
collaborators. When banks and their counsel do not work together often,
upward price revision occurs a little more than 45 percent of the time.
However, when the two are frequent collaborators, the probability is nearly
60 percent.
To measure this effect precisely, I employ a probit regression to determine
whether the offering price was revised upward past the maximum of the
initial offer range for the sample of issues that showed a significant increase
in value (20 percent and 30 percent above the upper filing range on the
thirtieth trading day, controlling for S&P returns during that time period).
Panel A of Appendix Table 3 shows the results of the probit regression
(marginal effects are reported). Frequent collaborators are 8 to 9 percent
more likely to correctly revise the filing price upward past the high end of
the initial offer range for strong performers.146 This finding in turn further
supports a conclusion that relational dynamics between the underwriter and
its counsel improve the deal.

146. Other studies that examine price revision typically measure from the midpoint of the
initial offer range. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34. The measures
employed in my study are intentionally conservative, to err on the side of caution. Employing
the methodology used in other studies would have made the results in this specification appear
stronger.
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I note that an alternative possible interpretation posited in the literature is
that price revision in fact represents lower levels of due diligence by the
underwriter and counsel prior to the offering.147 Scholars advancing this
interpretation reason that pricing can be done one of two ways: through preoffering information discovery (via due diligence) or through bookbuilding,
during which investors convey pricing information to the issuer and
underwriters by means of the demand they express for the stock.148 Some
scholars posit that there is a tradeoff between due diligence-related ex ante
pricing and ex post price discovery through bookbuilding.149 If enough
information is available to price the stock before bookbuilding, then the
disclosure will be more informative and there will be a lower incidence of
price revision during bookbuilding.150 Likewise, if less diligence is
conducted, then disclosure will be less informative and use more boilerplate
language, resulting in the need to rely on the bookbuilding process for price
discovery and leading to more price revision.151 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to analyze the plausibility of this interpretation in detail.
However, I note that even if this interpretation is correct, it would support
the conclusion that the underwriter’s counsel are doing an increasingly good
job for the underwriter with repeated representations. This is because the
underwriter, if given a choice, would prefer to allow for price discovery ex
post through bookbuilding over conducting costly and time-consuming
research ex ante.152 From the underwriter’s perspective, this is a more
efficient outcome because the underwriter expends fewer resources, but is
still just as well off, if not better off, because it does not suffer ill effects from
underpricing (and may even benefit from it).
b. Isolating the Effects of Interaction from
Experience or Reputation
To test whether the results with respect to price performance could be
driven by the experience or reputation of counsel or the underwriters, I
construct variables to account for the experience of both as signaled by the
number of deals done in a given industry and within a given time period. I
also create variables to represent the market share of each bank and firm
during the year preceding any particular deal, to provide a measure of the
prestige of each firm. I use these variables in the regressions specified above
to see if they impact the result, and find that they do not. These results are
reported in Appendix Tables 7, 8, 11, and 12. That measures of both bank
and law firm experience, as well as measures of reputation as proxied by
market share, do not change the estimates in the model strongly indicates that

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
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the results are not driven by experience and substantive skill, or by reputation
and signaling effects with respect to either the banks or the firms. This in
turn provides support for the conclusion that relational factors resulting from
repeated interaction drive the results.
4. Litigation
The filing of securities litigation is a salient indicator of deal performance,
particularly if it happens within a relatively short period of time following
the IPO.153 Securities liability can arise for numerous reasons and does not
necessarily indicate problems with the lawyers or their relationship with their
clients. Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either increased or decreased
litigation may indicate either weaker or stronger disclosure and deals.
In order to examine whether interaction has any impact on litigation, I
perform a probit regression on the occurrence of class action lawsuits within
six months and within one year154 of an IPO for which the underwriter and
the underwriter’s counsel were frequent collaborators. While the timeframes
are somewhat arbitrary, it is often the case that IPO-related class actions are
filed within the first year.155 Controls are the same as those used in the
previous regressions. The results are shown in Panel A of Appendix B Table
4.
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between litigation and
frequent interaction between the underwriter and its counsel within the
preceding year. The negative coefficient for class actions within six months
indicates that, if anything, there may be a very small decrease in the
probability of short-term litigation, but there is not enough of a relationship
to draw any strong conclusions. The lack of significant result remains for
deals within the past two and three years as well. The lack of relationship is
noteworthy in comparison to the incidence of litigation seen in relation to
other interactions, as discussed below.
Before concluding the analysis of litigation as well as short-term price
performance, I should note another prominent, but unlikely, theory of
underpricing that could affect the interpretation. This theory explains
underpricing as a form of insurance against IPO-related litigation.156 To
understand why this might make sense, consider that section 11 of the
153. Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in the
dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to the same issuer.
This number constitutes 4.36 percent of the dataset.
154. The six-month and one-year cutoffs are more conservative than those used in other
studies of IPO litigation. See, e.g., Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315 (2002) (analyzing the occurrence of litigation at any
time after the IPO). The six-month and one-year cutoff are used to ensure that litigation is
related to the IPO, and in particular, the IPO-related work product that the lawyers would have
produced.
155. See id. at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed).
156. See generally Tiniç, supra note 134 (originating the hypothesis that underpricing
serves as insurance for litigation); see also Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–11 (providing
empirical support for the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing).
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Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misstatements in a
prospectus that lead to losses by investors.157 Underwriting banks have been
able to escape liability in such lawsuits by claiming that they conducted
adequate due diligence and that statements in the prospectus were true to the
best of their knowledge;158 however, issuing companies are not able to
employ a due diligence defense and therefore bear strict liability for material
misstatements that result in losses to investors.159 Liability under section 11
is limited to the difference between the market price of the stock and the
offering price.160 In practice, this means that an issuer faces potential liability
any time its stock price drops below the offering price after the IPO, because
even frivolous claims usually settle before the existence of any material
misstatement or omission is ever adjudicated on the merits.161 With that
danger in mind, issuers and their underwriters might use underpricing as a
form of insurance against section 11 liability because if the offering price is
low enough, it is very unlikely that the market price will drop below it.162
If underpricing is insurance against litigation, then one might interpret the
first day price jump results above, and the lack of any reduction in probability
in litigation reported in this section, to conclude that frequent interaction is
causing issuers to pay for costly insurance that is having no measurable
effect. This would, of course, indicate a negative outcome from repeated
interactions.

157. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
158. See, e.g., Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (establishing the due diligence defense for non-issuer defendants in prospectus-related
litigation if the defendant can show reasonable grounds for that belief after a reasonable
investigation into the truth of the alleged misstatements).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).
160. See id § 77k(e).
161. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 35, 35–36 (2009) (noting that securities class actions almost
always end in settlement regardless of the merits because “defendants, anxious to avoid the
distraction of litigation, high defense attorney fees, negative publicity surrounding a securities
lawsuit, and the specter of potentially bankrupting damages, may be willing to pay a
‘nuisance’ settlement to make the case go away, even when they perceive the likelihood of the
plaintiff succeeding at trial as rather low”). The perception of high levels of frivolous litigation
was one of the motivations behind the passage of the Private Securities Litigations Reform
Act of 1995. Id.
162. The issuer and underwriters can be—and often are—sued under section 10 and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with IPO-related losses. See id.
at 41–42. Damages for such actions are not limited by the offering price, but the issuer is not
subject to strict liability for damages in such cases. Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that “§ 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] was addressed to practices
that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent
conduct alone”), and 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (providing for “damages caused by” reliance on
material misstatements or omissions), with 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (providing for strict liability),
and 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (permitting damages “not exceeding the price at which the security
was offered to the public”). I focus in this section on liability under section 11 of the Securities
Act because that section is the primary source of liability for IPO firms, see Choi et al., supra
note 161, at 41, and provides much of the rationale for the litigation insurance explanation for
underpricing, see Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–13.
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However, while the underpricing-as-insurance argument makes logical
sense, it is widely disputed, and a priori problematic for a number of reasons.
First, there is evidence that underpricing leads to higher share turnover in the
aftermarket as investors who bought early seek to make a quick profit by
selling their cheaply purchased shares into the rising market.163 Higher share
turnover in the aftermarket, in turn, is an input of increased litigation.164
Therefore, underpricing may be just as likely to draw litigation as is it is to
deter it.
Second, and more significantly, using underpricing as litigation insurance
does not make economic sense because it would be vastly more expensive
than what would be warranted given the expected costs of IPO litigation.165
This is because the costs given up by the issuer due to high levels of
underpricing are likely to be much higher than the ex ante expected cost of
litigation in most circumstances, even taking into account non-liability
related transaction costs, such as the costs of counsel, reputational costs, and
management’s time and energy costs.166
Third, it has been widely noted that other countries with developed
securities markets have far less securities litigation, and are much less
plaintiff friendly, but still have underpricing similar to what is seen in many
U.S. IPOs.167 Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of any association
163. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum,
and Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 107 (2002) (describing this model as an
alternative interpretation).
164. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 320–21. Lowry and Shu use market turnover as
an input into litigation risk. See id. at 321 (“Stock turnover, measured as the proportion of
shares traded at least once during a given period, is also related to plaintiffs’ incentives to
initiate lawsuits. This is because shareholder damages are generally increasing in the number
of shares traded at the allegedly misleading prices. . . . Not surprisingly, sued firms have
significantly higher turnover.”).
165. This point has been made by numerous critics of the litigation insurance hypothesis.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 19–20.
166. To illustrate, the average probability of class action litigation within the first year for
all deals in the dataset is 4 percent. The average payment for settlement of securities class
actions is approximately $3 million. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 310, 315 (noting
average settlement payment of $3.3 million in “lawsuit sample . . . of all firms that had an IPO
between 1988 and 1995”). Meanwhile, the average level of underpricing is closer to 20
percent, which on average amounts to $39.4 million left on the table given the average deal
size in the dataset (or $10.8 million in terms of median deal size in the dataset). This means
that underpricing would be the equivalent of paying roughly $10.8 million to $39.4 million to
avoid an average expected litigation cost of $120,000 ($3 million * .04), making underpricing
an extraordinarily high price to pay to avoid litigation cost, even accounting for reputational
and other harms that result from litigation. See also Qing Hao, Securities Litigation,
Withdrawal Risk and Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 438, 454 (2011) (reporting the
results of a recent empirical analysis showing no reliable relation between underpricing and
subsequent litigation risk for U.S. IPOs from 1996 to 2005); Jay R. Ritter, Equilibrium in the
Initial Public Offerings Market, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 347, 354 (2011) (“This lawsuit
avoidance theory of underpricing has the problem that leaving money on the table is an
incredibly inefficient way of deterring lawsuits: The opportunity cost in foregone proceeds is
$1 for what is at most a few cents of expected benefits.”).
167. See Ritter, supra note 166, at 354 (“[T]he litigation environment in the U.S. is fairly
unique, yet the magnitude of IPO underpricing in the U.S. is not unusual.”).
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between lawyer-client familiarity and reduction in litigation rates has any
negative implications for the other results reported here.
5. Disclosure
The amount of different types of disclosure in the prospectus does not, by
itself, indicate a positive or negative outcome for the deal. However, because
disclosure is a facet of the deal most directly influenced by counsel, it is
useful to analyze it, both to inform the other results and to provide some
insight on the possible mechanisms at work in the results previously reported.
Appendix Table 10, Panel A, shows the effects of repeated interactions
between an underwriter and its counsel and risk factors. The table
demonstrates a significant effect from repeated interaction: each additional
deal together in the preceding year is associated with a 30 percent increase in
the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors. For repeated deals
in the past two years, the marginal increase is 20 percent, and for three years,
it is 15 percent, all significant at the .1 percent level.168
The content and impact of different risk factors vary, and so it is not always
clear which party, if any, benefits from increased levels of such disclosure.
On the one hand, it is potentially prophylactic against litigation. On the other
hand, it may lead to underpricing and even provide a roadmap for litigation.
Generally speaking, the underwriter in a typical IPO tends to favor more
negative disclosure than the issuer. This is due to the fact that, unlike the
issuer, the underwriter benefits from negative disclosure, as it gains
protection from liability while suffering few of its costs, because it can
benefit even if the offering price is negatively impacted.169 Therefore, from
a better team dynamic between underwriters and counsel one would predict
an increased proportion of negative to positive disclosure (estimated here as
the share of the prospectus devoted to risk factors).
Despite the ambiguity of the level of disclosure, given the lack of
association between repeated interactions and litigation demonstrated in the
preceding section, a tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in risk
factor disclosure is beneficial. The benefit likely inures to the underwriter
more than the issuer, as the underwriter stands to lose less and gain more
from underpricing and thus has a different cost-benefit analysis with respect
to litigation risk.
6. Time to Deal Completion
Repeated interaction reveals a small but significant positive effect on the
length of time to complete a deal. If repeated interaction and better teamwork
yield positive benefits, one would expect efficiency and speed to be one of
them. Therefore, I test the data to see if repeated interactions between
168. Results for share of the prospectus devoted to MD&A were not significant and not
reported.
169. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810; see also Nocera, supra note 14.
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underwriters and counsel lead to a decrease in the length of time that deals
take. As mentioned in the previous section, many factors could influence the
timing of the offering, and some of those factors cannot be controlled for in
a regression. Therefore, while the lack of a trend would not necessarily be
troubling, a general trend would provide further evidence of negative or
positive effects from repeated interactions.
I analyze the length of time between the date that Form S-1 is filed with
the SEC and the offer date. This time period is only a portion of the entire
length of the deal, but it nonetheless must serve as a proxy because it is the
only observable information regarding the length of time to complete the
deal. Because the timing of the deal may depend on market conditions in a
relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the offering, I construct a
dummy variable for each quarter of the IPO year, instead of using the entire
year variable as in other regressions. In addition, the number of lead
managers in the deal have a significant impact on deal length (each additional
manager increases the deal length by approximately six days), so the
managers are added to the group of controls. In my preferred specification,
I limit the analysis to deals that are completed within one year, because the
presence of a number of long-dated deals in the dataset raises the possibility
of overstating the true effect of repeated interactions. The results are reported
in Panel A of Appendix Table 5.
The results of the analysis indicate a modest but significant reduction by
almost two days in the amount of time to complete a deal, for each repeated
interaction within the past year. This effect fades in both magnitude and
significance for repeated interactions within two and three years. In general,
however, the trend supports the idea that better teamwork produces better
results.
7. Integer Versus Decimal Pricing
The type of price arrived at likewise indicates positive benefits for the
underwriter from repeated interaction with its counsel. Other research on
IPOs hypothesizes that if an IPO is priced using a non-integer number then
the issuer’s management team had more information and negotiated more
effectively over price than might otherwise be the case.170 The reason for
this conclusion is that arriving at whole numbers in a negotiation suggests
less thorough analysis of relevant criteria and more reliance on anchoring
techniques.171
Panel A of Appendix Table 6 reports the results of a probit regression
measuring the change in probability of a non-integer price with repeated
interactions. The results show a small but significant effect, with each
170. See Daniel J. Bradley et al., Negotiation and the IPO Offer Price: A Comparison of
Integer Vs. Non-Integer IPOs, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 517, 518 (2004) (arguing
that non-integer prices represent more negotiation effort and less uncertainty regarding
offering price).
171. See id. at 528–29. This methodology is borrowed from Bradley and his coauthors.
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repeated interaction within the past year resulting in a 1.3 percent lower
chance of the final price being an integer.172 Significance does not remain
for interactions over two and three years. Nonetheless, this may indicate a
stronger negotiating position on the part of the underwriter, aided by
assistance from familiar counsel.
D. Interactions Between Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
One might expect the lawyers on either side of the table in a capital
markets deal to gain perhaps the most from repeated interaction. These
individuals encounter each other frequently, and a good working relationship
can help them to work more effectively together. Analysis of frequent
interaction between sets of counsel, however, yields few significant results.
1. Price Performance
As before, first day price increase is examined for counsel-counsel repeat
interactions. The results for first day price increase, reported in Panel B of
Appendix Table 1, indicate a moderate but significant effect. These
significant but modest price gains are sustained over thirty, sixty, and ninety
days, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 2
2. Price Revision
I again examine the probability of correct upward price revision and find
there is a weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) relationship between
interactions and the probability of upward price revision when the first day
bounce is 30 percent or more. No other significant results are seen. These
results are reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 3.
3. Litigation
Each additional interaction between sets of counsel is associated with a
small (0.6 percent) but significant decrease in class action litigation filed
within six months following the IPO offer date. No significant relationship
is seen when the time period is expanded to one year, as shown in Panel B of
Appendix Table 4.
4. Disclosure
Counsel deals together continue the trend of marginally increasing risk
factor disclosure, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 10. The degree
of increase remains relatively constant regardless of whether the previous
interaction has taken place in the past one year (19 percent), two years (17.3

172. Out of 2265 deals in the dataset, 383 (14.03 percent) came to a final price using a
decimal number.

MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX

142

10/4/2015 11:48 AM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

percent), or three years (15 percent).173 Once again, this result is obtained
after controlling for factors that might otherwise influence risk factors or the
riskiness of the firm overall: the firm’s industry, the time period, the age of
the company, the size of the company (measured by company assets), and
the involvement of sophisticated venture capital investors. This suggests that
the inclusion of additional risk factors may be driven more by norms of legal
practice with regard to prospectus drafting than by anything related to the
deal itself or the parties at the table.
As above, risk factors increasing while the probability of a securities class
action either decreases or bears no relationship to risk factors, could indicate
that the two sets of counsel, working together more frequently, are doing
marginally better work and protecting firms from litigation (at least in the
first six months).
5. Deal Timing and Integer Pricing
No significant relationship was identified between deal timing and integer
pricing, as shown in Panel C of Appendix B Table 5. This was somewhat
surprising, given that better team dynamics would presumably create a more
efficient process. However, the length of time a deal takes may be affected
by many factors outside the lawyers’ control. The timing of the deal is also
usually managed by the underwriters more than other parties at the table, so
perhaps it should not be surprising that counsel does not affect it. Testing for
integer pricing yields a marginally significant, but very small negative result.
This result indicates that counsel pairs may have a very small effect on what
kind of price issuers choose. However, this result may also be an artifact of
the reality that there are many counsel interactions and relatively few noninteger prices in the dataset.
E. Interpretation of Results
1. Summary of Findings
Taken together, the results above indicate some positive benefits of
repeated collaboration between underwriters and their counsel, as well as
between different sets of lawyers on opposite sides of a deal. In particular,
when the lead underwriter and its counsel have worked together frequently,
deals tend to perform better in the short and long term, and they are less
marked by signs of pricing error or excessively high, unmitigated
underpricing. While negative and risk-related disclosure increase somewhat
in such interactions, there is no corresponding association with litigation in
the first year, when IPO-related litigation is most likely. The data also
suggests that deals get done slightly faster. Similar results are evident for
deals in which both sets of counsel have worked together frequently, except
173. Each is significant at the 1 percent level. Results for share of the prospectus devoted
to MD&A were not significant and not reported.
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that there is a small but significant negative marginal effect on litigation
within the first year but there is no significant effect on deal timing. This
suggests that counsels’ relational dynamics in these situations improves the
transaction by reducing uncertainty, the cost of information production, and
lowering agency costs and transaction costs.
With respect to the two sets of counsel, the results are more mixed. First
day price jump increases modestly in repeated interactions, indicating low
levels of underpricing. Nonetheless, no significant result is seen with respect
to price correction. This could simply be due to more accurate pricing to
begin with, or it might indicate that repeated interactions between counsel
have a relatively modest impact on the ability of the deal team to market the
deal. The price performance over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety days is
strong, further indicating a good deal. Repeated interactions are associated
with lower probability of litigation, at least in the short term.
2. Caveats and Robustness Checks
While the associations described above provide interesting insights, the
regression analysis alone gives no assurance that some underlying factors are
not driving the repeated selection of both the banks and the different sets of
counsel, as well as the results. For instance, the industry of the company
going public, the size of the company, the time period of the IPO, or the
recent experience of a particular law firm in a particular industry might all
factor into the choice to use the same counsel for multiple deals in a given
time period. At the same time, such factors could influence the results of the
deal, without regard to the effect of repeated interaction. To conclude that
repeated interaction is indeed driving the results, I must rule out the impacts
of such factors as drivers of the results. I employ a number of strategies to
do so.
As previously explained, to rule out the impact of time period and industry,
I use year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the interaction of the two.
In alternative specifications, I use a fixed effect for the quarter in which an
IPO occurs, interacted with the industry of the issuing company. In my main
specification, I also use a fixed effect for each underwriter, with no
significant change in the results. In addition, there are several years in the
dataset in which IPO activity, as well as several of the outcome variables
analyzed in the paper, is especially high. The years 1999 and 2000 have
especially high numbers of IPOs (as well as repeated interactions) and are
associated with very high levels of underpricing and litigation. Although the
use of fixed effects for these years removes the mean impact of these years
on the outcomes, as a further test of robustness I remove all deals completed
in these years from the data set completely, and the results remain.
As discussed above, law firm experience and reputation are also unlikely
to be driving the results. When a control for law firm experience is used, the
results remain unchanged. In addition, if “law firm deals” is used as a
dependent variable in the analysis, only a small benefit is apparent. Further,
the consensus among practitioners interviewed for the study is that the
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markets do not consider the reputation of the law firms representing the
parties in the deal when making investment decisions. This may reflect that
all of the firms who do IPOs are of sufficiently high quality, and therefore
reputation does not matter. But in any event, law firm reputation and
experience do not explain the results.
Nor is it problematic that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm is
often based on either a previous relationship or recent experience doing IPOs
in a given industry. Indeed, that explanation would be consistent with the
findings above, as well as other empirical research on clients’ choice of
lawyers.174 It would be difficult to imagine how such previous relationships
would be related to the outcomes analyzed herein, except through the
relational effects I am studying. With respect to the law firms’ recent
experience and reputation, I employ several strategies to rule these out as
confounding factors. To rule out the possibility that law firm quality or
experience is driving the result, I construct variables to represent the number
of deals each firm has done in the previous one year, two years, and three
years in each industry and overall. These variables do not change the results
when added to the model. I also add fixed effects for certain law firms that
appear most frequently in the dataset, and the results remain.175
Finally, other factors that may influence selection of counsel, as well as
the outcome variables, are factors related to the quality of the deal,
availability of information about the issuer, and sophistication of the parties.
These factors are: the presence of venture capital or private equity investors,
the age of the company (which impacts the amount of information available
about the company), the value of the company in terms of total assets, the
value of the company as determined by book value per share, the size of the
underwriting syndicate, and the proportion of insider stock sold in the deal.176
Including these factors in the model yields the same results as those obtained
in my preferred specification. All results discussed in the subsection are
reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 8 for the first day price bounce and
probability of litigation variables.
To illustrate the point further, the results with respect to an issuing
company’s counsel could be interpreted to suggest that some underlying
factors are driving both underpricing and litigation risk, as well as the
selection of counsel. This explanation draws from theories of underpricing
as both insurance for, and deterrent to, litigation previously mentioned.177
174. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1001.
175. In particular, Wilson Sonsini appears a disproportionately high number of times on
the dataset (n=426). Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini does not change the results.
Removing Wilson Sonsini completely from the dataset lowers the precision of the estimates
in the model such that they are no longer significant, which is to be expected when removing
such a large number of data points. Nonetheless the results remain even under that
specification.
176. Recall also that deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard control
in all specifications.
177. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309, 320–21; see also Alexander, supra note 12,
at 19 (“A large literature has attempted to explain IPO underpricing. One intriguing theory is
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Under this theory, the level of underpricing might correspond to the litigation
risk inherent in the issue, on the assumption that pricing lower would reduce
the probability of the issuance being overpriced. An overpriced issue draws
more litigation because when the price inevitably falls in the market,
investors lose money and often will bring suit. Moreover, where there is
inherent uncertainty regarding the issuer’s valuation or industry,
underpricing may further help to mitigate the associated risks.178
The tests described here make this interpretation unlikely, because if this
story were true, one would expect to see the underpricing and litigation
effects disappear when controlling for factors that would ex ante impact the
risk of litigation for a particular firm. However, that result is not observed.
The systematic incremental nature of the results (i.e., that each additional
interaction is associated with an incremental increase in underpricing and
litigation on average) also makes it unlikely that there is an underlying factor
driving the results as well as the selection of counsel. In order for such
underlying factors to be at work, it would have to be true that the parties
selecting members of the deal team are doing so based on a very accurate
prediction of the future levels of underpricing and litigation. This would
mean not only systematically predicting the level of underpricing and
litigation with a high degree of accuracy, but also choosing different counsel
and banks to work together and across the table from each other a specific
number of times based on the specific prediction for each deal. As discussed
above, that scenario is extremely unlikely, especially once other possible
confounding factors are controlled for.
III. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The findings above indicate that the frequency of lawyer-client interaction
plays a significant role in the quality of IPO deal outcomes. This has
implications for how deals are currently structured and the lawyers’
conception of their role as both team member and agent. Specifically, these
findings have implications for the role of teamwork in deal making and the
principal-agent tension between lawyers and their clients.
A. Lawyers, Clients, and Teamwork
1. Importance of Teamwork for Deal Lawyers
IPO transactions can fairly be described as team production endeavors,
although teamwork is all too rarely considered in legal theory or practice.179

that IPOs are underpriced as a form of insurance against legal liability based on claims of
federal securities law violations on the offering.”).
178. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 18–20 (explaining the litigation theory).
179. Some excellent examples do exist, however. See, e.g., Utset, supra note 3, at 275–80;
see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247–55 (1999) (describing corporate outputs as the products of team,
rather than principal-agent efforts).
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Teams in the legal context can be defined, borrowing from social science, as
a bounded social system whose members are interdependent and whose
members are working toward a shared purpose.180 The benefits of teamwork
over individual effort have been well documented.181 Despite this fact, and
the prevalence of team tasks in the practice of law, the profession is only
beginning to provide the necessary attention to relational skills or to the
systematic study of a matter of theoretical importance or skills training.
Lawyers and their professional governance are more frequently analyzed
through the lens of principal-agent theory,182 although an equally appropriate
lens would be that of team production theory in certain instances. This is
especially true when lawyers are engaged in capital markets deals. While the
lawyer-client relationship has principal and agency features, the lawyer in
such situations does not simply await orders from the client to act upon; the
lawyers help to shape those wishes by conveying advice and information
about what is appropriate and wise in a given context.183 They often help to
prompt the client to action and inform them about what they should be doing
at a given point in time in the deal.184
Relationships and repeated interactions play a critical role in establishing
good team processes.185 The relational dynamics emerging from repeated
interactions have the capacity to produce significantly better team
performance and, in theory, better output.186 One common feature of teams
that perform well is familiarity among the team members and experience
working together multiple times in the past.187 This point is illustrated in a
study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
showing that team functioning, rather than mechanical problems or technical
ability of individual pilots, is the key cause of most airline accidents.188 This
180. See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 10, at 777.
181. See, e.g., JACK D. OSBORN ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED WORK TEAMS: THE NEW AMERICAN
CHALLENGE (1990); see also Paul Osterman, Supervision, Discretion, and Work Organization,
84 AM. ECON. REV. 380, 380–84 (1994).
182. See, e.g., Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–34 (analyzing the tension between
lawyers as agents and their clients as principals).
183. See Blair & Stout, supra note 179, at 259 (“[P]art of the agent’s job is to figure out
what needs to be done (a situation we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most
public corporations). A related point is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear
who the principal is and who the agent is in the particular relationship or transaction under
study. Yet many of the most important relationships inside corporations may be more
ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive inputs and neither
may have authority over the other.”).
184. This point will be familiar to many who have practiced in capital markets and was
confirmed by practitioner interviews.
185. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“In that sense, team cognitive structures,
emergent states, and routinized behavior patterns are the echoes of repeated process
interactions and, hence, are indicative of the nature and quality of dynamic team processes.”).
186. See id.
187. See id. (“[R]epeated interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to
regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent
process interactions. Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”).
188. See Robert L. Helmreich, On Error Management: Lessons from Aviation, 320 BMJ
781, 781–85 (2000); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and
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study highlights a fact which is born out in NTSB statistics: that 73 percent
of accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s first day flying together, and
44 percent of those accidents happened on the crew’s very first flight.189
Research on airline crews and teams of doctors further shows that
experienced teams who have worked together in the past perform
significantly better—even when fatigued—than do rested crews who have
not worked together before.190 Relational benefits translate to deals as well.
Parties involved develop trust and learn each others’ norms for
communication, language coding, risk tolerance, preferences, preferred roles,
strengths, weaknesses, and working styles.191 As lawyer and client come to
better understand each other, the lawyer is more able to anticipate his or her
client’s needs, negotiating positions, and areas of focus.192 The lawyer can
act as a better agent in managing the transaction and in dealing with the issuer
and its counsel in the conduct of due diligence and disclosure drafting. The
client, in turn, is freer to engage in the business-oriented side of the deal, with
an informational and legal product that matches its expectations and needs.
2. Making the Whole Better than the Sum of Its Parts
While good teamwork can be beneficial, it does not necessarily appear
spontaneously, and optimal team dynamics must be cultivated. Team efforts
are generally found to be better than individual ones, but it is not always the
case that teams produce gains exceeding those of the sum of their parts.193
Groups can suffer from process losses, such as coordination, and motivation
problems can erode the benefit of team effort.194 This reality has been born
out in experiments comparing actual teams and “nominal” teams (teams that
never work together but whose output is constructed by aggregating the
output of each individual) in the performance of a given task.195 In many of
these experiments, adding the output of members of the nominal team
produces results that are as good as or better than those obtained by the actual
teams.196 This research suggests that teams do not automatically get better

Aviation: Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BMJ 745, 745–49 (2000); see also Kozlowski & Ilgen,
supra note 84, at 86–87 (explaining an experiment where teams were given the task of creating
origami birds and became more efficient when they repeated the task together, but less
efficient when members of the team were replaced with new members).
189. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250.
190. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 77–81.
191. See id. at 84 (“[W]e conclude that a shared team mental model that captures the
structure of relations among key aspects of the team, its task and role system, and its
environment is a key emergent cognitive structure that shapes coordination processes relevant
to team goals and their accomplishment.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 17–19
(discussing the importance of coordination among deal team members and the need to have a
common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished).
192. See id.
193. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50.
194. See generally IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1972).
195. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 246.
196. Id.
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results simply by virtue of being a team.197 Repeated interaction appears to
aid team dynamics over time, but other useful team skills may be less
intuitive.198 Creating an effective team requires certain conditions to be met,
and the presence of those conditions will increase the likelihood that a team
will function well.199 In addition, research suggests that collaboration among
lawyers may become harder to achieve when the lawyers face performance
pressure, or when a client situation is perceived to be high stakes.200 An IPO
can easily become such a situation. It is worth considering how to improve
upon lawyers’ relational skill to avoid some of these problems. Best
practices, including relatively simple but effective interventions such as
appointing a definite leader, clearly defining roles, explicitly expressing
norms of behavior, and setting concrete expectations can improve
collaboration but do not necessarily happen naturally.201 In addition, further
research would be useful to discover how lawyers might be able to foster
better collaboration and leverage some of the benefits of familiarity, even
without the benefit of repeated interactions with other lawyers or clients. For
example, a more intentional focus on group processes and communication
norms might lead to better group interaction without having to learn by trial
and error. Moreover, learning to recognize and diagnose group process
problems early on might lead to better collaboration even without repeated
interactions.
That relational skill can have such a large impact on a transaction implies
that collaboration and teamwork should be further addressed in the legal
profession in order to garner more of its benefits. It is often assumed that
members of teams do not require any particular additional skills to be
effective team members.202 That is rarely the case. This may be especially
true for individuals trained as lawyers, given the individualistic nature of
many of the pursuits that gain recognition in legal education.203 If it is true
that relational skill and effective teamwork can have a significant and
tangible impact on the substantive outcomes of a business transaction, then
relational skill should be added alongside technical knowledge of regulation
and value creation in the set of tools important to transaction cost
engineering. It is worth considering how a lawyer’s team management and
process management skills come into play in this context and how they might
be honed and enhanced.

197. Id. at 254.
198. Id. at 249–50 (discussing elements of high performing teams that are not necessarily
intuitive).
199. Id. at 248.
200. See Heidi K. Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING TALENT
FOR SUCCESS 145, 145–46 (Rebecca Normand-Hochman ed., 2013) (discussing research
indicating that lawyers become less creative, and more risk averse and less likely to
collaborate, when they perceive the stakes to be high).
201. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 254–56.
202. Id. at 254.
203. See id. (noting that individualistic work cultures may not readily lend themselves to
collaboration).
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In addition to familiarity and repeated interaction, research has identified
conditions which facilitate effective collaboration and without which
collaboration rarely yields results better than what individuals can do on their
own. These conditions include: setting clear boundaries for group
membership and involvement, ensuring that team members have a clear idea
of the team’s goals and direction, allowing individuals’ various levels of
expertise to be leveraged, providing clear norms of conduct, and providing
ample opportunities for feedback and direction on the group’s processes.204
While these conditions may seem simple, they are often overlooked. In
addition, many groups harbor incorrect assumptions about what makes
teamwork successful. One such assumption concerns the roles of team
leaders. While leaders are important for setting direction, it is typically better
for leaders to set up the conditions that facilitate team functioning, as opposed
to being overly directive, or overly hands-off.205 Another commonly held
assumption is that contrarian attitudes are corrosive to team behavior. While
someone who is overly averse to teamwork may be ill-suited for group work,
groups tend to function best when they have a member who challenges group
assumptions and orthodoxies.206 Without the voice of dissent, groups can
become mediocre, and fall into patterns of groupthink. The problem is that
most participants in group work tend to shy away from challenging
orthodoxies, believing that it will create conflict and disrupt the group
dynamic.207
These are just a few examples, and this Article does not purport to provide
an exhaustive list of ways in which group processes can be tweaked so that
deal teams can perform optimally. However, the legal profession would have
much to gain from further consideration of how to capture more benefits from
group processes in deal making. It is worth considering how such skills can
be taught to practicing lawyers as well as law students. At the very least,
team skills should receive more emphasis and study than they currently do,
and an awareness of relational dynamics should be incorporated into law
school as well as continuing education curricula. It is also worth considering
how the incentive structures that exist in most law practices might be tweaked
to reward team performance, as opposed to individual performance, such as
billable hour targets which bear relationship to firm profitability in the short
term without necessarily bearing any relationship to the lawyers’ ability to
best serve clients.
3. Managing Drawbacks of Teamwork
Group collaboration also deserves attention in the transactional context
because of its potential to conflict with a lawyer’s agency duties. The group

204.
205.
206.
05.
207.

See id. at 264–66.
See id. at 265–66.
See Diane Coutu, Why Teams Don’t Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 99, 102–
See id.
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production task that lawyers are involved in when doing an IPO necessarily
involves partisan interests. So-called groupthink and other byproducts of
team production may poorly serve clients whose interests diverge from those
of others at the table.208 This may detract from the benefits of team
functioning and undermine the lawyer’s central role as advocate for his or
her client. One means of managing the tension is to develop a better
understanding of when the role of team member and agent are likely to come
into conflict. This in turn requires a better understanding of where parties’
interests might diverge.
However, simply understanding where interests diverge is an incomplete
solution. Lawyers must know how and when to raise issues and not feel the
pressure of the group to suppress concerns. At first glance, it may seem that
identifying divergence of interest might be antithetical to good team function.
However, the ability to raise conflicts is an important component of team
functioning, and finding ways to do so may in fact enhance team
dynamics.209 Research on team dynamics suggests that one component of
highly effective teams is a set of norms and practices governing dispute
resolution.210 A more explicit understanding of the interaction between
agency and teamwork and norms promoting productive avenues of dissent
when necessary would allow deal lawyers to leverage team dynamics while
still remaining zealous advocates. Lawyers’ process expertise is particularly
suited to designing and implementing such systems, and further education
and research in this area would yield enormous benefits to transactional
lawyers.
B. Recommendations
If teamwork has its benefits, it may have drawbacks as well, particularly
for the deal lawyer, who must balance the competing concerns of advocacy
with the coordination and cooperation that facilitate deal making. Simply
working repeatedly with other members of a deal team is not enough to
promote better deal outcomes, as demonstrated by the results for repeated
interactions between sets of lawyers. Leveraging the benefits of teamwork
without sacrificing the duty of agency will involve more intentional
consideration of both and a more complex model of the deal negotiations
than is typically described. I briefly describe some proposals here for how
that could be done in the area of securities law and in legal professional
education. These are preliminary and require further research.
1. Securities Law
One proposal that the empirical findings of this Article would seem to
suggest is an update of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. The
208. See Kozlowski et al., supra note 84, at 77, 81.
209. See PFEIFFER BOOK OF SUCCESSFUL TEAM-BUILDING TOOLS 247–65 (Elaine Biech, ed.
2008); Hackman, supra note 6, at 255.
210. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250.
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findings provide empirical support for the proposition that disclosure does
indeed matter to the markets, and if that is the case, it would seem that the
prior relationships among members of the deal team are a factor to be
considered when weighing what the disclosure says. It may well be the case
that the “reasonable” investor may not know or care about the effects of
repeated interactions. However, market analysts and others who provide
them with information may find the disclosure more useful.
2. Education and Training
Though other professions have embraced teamwork and collaboration as a
crucial component of professional education, law has been slow to embrace
it. Business schools and medical schools routinely incorporate team tasks
and skills training into their basic curriculum, based on compelling research
that good teamwork fosters better results and poor teamwork fosters
mistakes. With respect to law, team skills are equally important. While this
is evident in the transactional context, in the litigation context lawyers
frequently work in teams as well. In fact, in a law firm practice of any size,
lawyers frequently engage in team tasks and could serve their clients far
better if such tasks were optimally structured. However, for lawyers, the
team dynamic takes on additional complications for all of the reasons
discussed in this Article. This suggests that not only are team skills
important, but so is the complex skill of balancing team productivity with
advocacy.
CONCLUSION
To ask how lawyers add value is to miss half the equation. In transactional
practice, lawyers and clients add value by working together effectively to
accomplish a common aim. This Article provides evidence that repeated
lawyer-client interaction leads to better substantive deal outcomes. This is a
conclusion that should come as little surprise, but it has not previously been
documented to the same degree. The results suggest that lawyers do their
best work when they form effective teams with their clients because they
establish trust and learn how to optimize their roles, communication styles,
and preferences. This is a natural product of repeated interactions, but it can
also be enhanced by more intentional awareness of the importance of team
dynamics. Precisely how lawyers can work better with clients is an issue that
warrants further study, but it is clear that lawyers would benefit if the issue
were addressed earlier in their training and more directly. Law schools
currently lack much training relating to teams or managing group processes,
a feature which puts law students behind peers in professions like business
and medicine. Moreover, these topics are virtually absent from continuing
legal education. Nonetheless, if lawyers are to be effective “transaction cost
engineers,” these skills are essential, particularly at a time when the value of
legal education is in question and corporate clients complain that lawyers
lack value additive skills.
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APPENDIX

Appendix Figure A:
Summary Statistics

N

Total IPO Deals

2,265

Lead Underwriters

268

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:
Past 1 Year

955

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

1.40

1.00

0.82

3.30

3.00

1.95

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:
Past 2 Years

1,135

3.89

3.00

2.63

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:
Past 3 Years

1,231

4.24

3.00

3.07

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel
Deals Together >1: Past 1 Year

493

4.53

3.00

3.41

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel deals
together >1: Past 2 years

582

5.51

3.00

4.90

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel
Deals Together >1: Past 3 Years

639

6.18

4.00

6.18

First Day Price Increase (percent) for all
deals

2,725*

28%

11%

59%

Log (gross proceeds) for all deals

2,725*

17.96

17.93

1.06

Company Age (years) for all deals

2,265

12.80

7.00

18.21

Syndicate Size (number of banks) for all
deals

2,265

9.00

8.29

11.41

* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more observations than deals. Observations are de-weighted
accordingly to account for this.
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Appendix Table 1:
Opening Day Performance and Repeated Interactions
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1)

(2)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.030*
(0.012)

(3)

(4)

0.033***
(0.007)

0.019*
(0.0078)

(5)

(6)

0.0257***
(0.0057)

0.014*
(0.006)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together
in Past Year
Deals Together
in Past 2 Years
Deals Together
in Past 3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.067***
(0.012)

0.054***
(0.016)

0.0668***
(0.0115)

0.053***
(0.0156)

0.0678***
(0.0116)

0.053***
(0.016)

R2

0.232

0.337

0.230

0.336

0.228

0.336

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

0.021**
(0.007)

0.015
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.052)

0.011
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.004)

0.009*
(0.005)

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together
in Past Year
Deals Together
in Past 2 Years
Deals Together
in Past 3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.0695***
(0.012)

0.048**
(0.016)

0.071***
(0.0121)

0.050**
(0.0156)

0.072***
(0.012)

0.051**
(0.015)

R2

0.223

0.335

0.224

0.335

0.225

0.34

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bank Dummies

X

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.

MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX

2015]

10/4/2015 11:48 AM

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN IPOs

155

Appendix Table 2:
30, 60 & 90 Day Price Performance
Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
(1)

30-Day
(2)

(3)

(4)

60-Day
(5)

(6)

(7)

90-Day
(8)

(9)

Panel A:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Managing
Underwriter
Deals
Together
in Past
Year

0.044***
(0.013)

Deals
Together
in Past 2
Years

0.068***
(0.019)

0.033***
(0.009)

Deals
Together
in Past 3
Years

0.074***
(0.024)

0.043***
(0.012)

0.028***
(0.007)

0.049***
(0.015)

0.034***
(0.012)

0.041***
(0.013)

R2

0.120

0.120

0.120

0.161

0.159

0.158

0.160

0.159

0.159

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,721

2,721

2,721

2,720

2,720

2,720

Panel B:
Issuer’s Counsel
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals
Together
in Past
Year

0.022*
(0.009)

Deals
Together
in Past 2
Years

0.038*
(0.016)

0.016*
(0.007)

Deals
Together
in Past 3
Years

0.041*
(0.017)

0.030*
(0.012)

0.013*
(0.006)

0.039**
(0.013)

0.025*
(0.010)

0.034**
(0.011)

R2

0.112

0.118

0.118

0.161

0.159

0.159

0.160

0.159

0.161

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,721

2,721

2,721

2,720

2,720

2,720

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*
Year
Dummies

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases.
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Appendix Table 3:
Probit Analysis of Upward Revision for Strong Performers
Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(1)

(2)

(3)

20% Bounce

(4)
30% Bounce

Panel A: Lead
Underwriter &
Underwriters’
Counsel
Frequent Collaborator

0.270**
(0.109)

0.262**
(0.113)

0.231
(0.124)

0.224
(0.129)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.582***
(0.078)

0.597***
(0.084)

0.486***
(0.910)

0.485***
(0.100)

Marginal Effect
(frequent)

0.093**
(0.037)

0.087**
(0.037)

0.079+
(0.043)

0.078+
(0.045)

964

906

698

625

Frequent Collaborator

0.120
(0.096)

0.142
(0.101)

0.058
(0.111)

0.098
(0.118)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.591***
(0.079)

0.608***
(0.085)

0.498***
(0.092)

0.499***
(0.100)

Marginal Effect
(frequent)

0.042
(0.033)

0.047
(0.034)

0.021
(0.038)

0.034
(0.041)

964

906

698

625

Industry Dummies

X

X

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

X

X

Number of Observations
Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel

Number of Observations

Industry*Year Dummies

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and
0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank
is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.

MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX

2015]

10/4/2015 11:48 AM

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN IPOs

157

Appendix Table 4:
Probit Analysis of Probability of Class Action Litigation
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action Litigation Filed
Within 6 Months
of Offer Date

Within 1 Year
of Offer Date

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.002
(0.039)

0.022
(0.038)

0.003
(0.027)

0.003
(0.030)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.237***
(0.057)

0.291***
(0.081)

0.254***
(0.469)

0.300***
(0.030)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.0007
(0.002)

0.0013
(0.0022)

0.0002
(0.0023)

0.0003
(0.0029)

Number of Observations

2,639

1,645

2,705

2,138

Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.120*
(0.061)

-0.113*
(0.057)

0.002
(0.024)

0.005
(0.024)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.262***
(0.073)

0.294***
(0.094)

0.288***
(0.057)

0.304***
(0.067)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.005
(0.002)

-0.006*
(0.003)

0.0001
(0.002)

0.0005
(0.002)

Number of Observations

Panel A: Lead
Underwriter &
Underwriters’
Counsel

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel

2,201

1,404

2,253

1,850

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year Dummies

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 5:
Time to Completion from S-1 Filing
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer Date (in days)
(1)

(2)

-2.52***
(0.916)

-1.76***
(0.580)

(3)

(4)

-1.80**
(0.66)

-0.883
(0.490)

(5)

(6)

-1.70***
(0.577)

-0.75
(0.427)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together
in the Preceding
1 Year
Deals Together
in the Preceding
2 Years
Deals Together
in the Preceding
3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

-8.17***
(2.50)

-9.73***
(1.50)

-10.55***
(2.56)

-9.83***
(1.50)

-10.48***
(2.55)

-9.83***
(1.50)

6.27
(3.70)

5.87***
(1.99)

5.53
(3.07)

5.97***
(1.99)

5.54
(3.07)

6.01***
(1.99)

R2

0.38

0.18

0.25

0.17

0.25

0.18

Number of
Observations

2,723

2,651

2,721

2,651

2,721

2,651

-0.794
(0.583)

-0.114
(0.483)

-0.590
(0.429)

-0.104
(0.372)

Lead
Underwriting
Bank

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together
in the Preceding
1 Year
Deals Together
in the Preceding
2 Years
Deals Together
in the Preceding
3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

-0.622
(0.344)

-0.184
(0.300)

-12.85***
(2.71)

-10.91***
(1.61)

-12.86***
(2.72)

-10.91
(1.61)

-12.85
(2.71)

-10.89
(1.61)

7.29
(4.98)

5.99
(3.22)

7.25
(4.97)

5.99
(3.21)

7.26
(4.97)

5.98
(3.21)

R2

0.21

0.17

0.21

0.17

0.21

0.17

Number of
Observations

2,262

2,209

2,262

2,209

2,262

2,209

Lead
Underwriting
Bank
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Appendix Table 5 cont.
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 filing to Offer Date (in days)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Quarter
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry
Dummies*
IPO Quarter
Dummies
All Deals
Deal Length <
365 Days

X

X
X

X
X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and
0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
The sample for this analysis was limited to deals that are completed in 365 days or less from the filing of the S-1. The reason for
limiting the sample in this way is to give a more accurate picture of the effect of counsel interactions. The majority of transactions
in the dataset are completed within one year of filing of the S-1, and the presence of a number of outlier deals that took much
longer than one year biased estimate of increased efficiency upward.
In addition, as the dependent variable in this specification is a time period less than one year long, a quarter-year fixed effect is used
instead of the IPO-year fixed effect used in other specifications.
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Appendix Table 6:
Probit Analysis of the Effects of Interactions on Probability
of Non-Integer Pricing
Dependent Variable: Non-Integer Offering Price
(1)

(2)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.062*
(0.026)

-0.064*
(0.028)

Log Opening Price

-0.486***
(0.079)

0.508***
(0.081)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.013**
(0.006)

-0.013**
(0.005)

Number of Observations

2,639

2,604

Deals Together in the
Preceding year

-0.071*
(0.030)

-0.075*
(0.032)

Log Opening Price

0.448***
(0.087)

0.492***
(0.089)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.015*
(0.006)

-0.015*
(0.007)

Number of Observations

2,263

2,199

Industry
Dummies

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel
& Issuer’s Counsel

Industry*Year Dummies

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 7:
Alternative Specification—Opening Day Price Increase
Outcome Variable
(1)

(2)

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Last 1 Year

Underwriter’s
Counsel and Issuer’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Last 1 Year

0.049***
(0.011)

0.021**
(0.007)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.029**
(0.012)

0.041*
(0.018)

0.031
(0.017)

0.044***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.010)

(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year

0.048***
(0.011)

0.027**
(0.011)

(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years

0.049***
(0.011)

0.029***
(0.010)

(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years

0.049***
(0.012)

0.029***
(0.010)

(9) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals; n=384)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.035***
(0.012)

(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in
the dataset

0.072***
(0.019)

0.031***
(0.011)

(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank
relationships

0.053***
(0.012)

0.033***
(0.009)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.031***
(0.009)

(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding

0.048***
(0.011)

0.030***
(0.009)

(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to
IPO

0.047***
(0.011)

0.030***
(0.009)

(15) IPO quarter instead of year

0.048***
(0.011)

0.031***
(0.010)

(16) Removing the year 1999

0.039***
(0.011)

0.022***
(0.008)

(17) Removing the year 2000

0.037***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.013)

(1) Preferred Estimate—with standard controls (standard errors)
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number
of deals
(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 40 IPO
deals
(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 80 IPO
deals
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar
marketshare
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar market share for IPOs in
preceding year
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs
in preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals
done

Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms

Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer
risk
(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since
founding

Altering year control categories
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Appendix Table 8:
Alternative Specifications for Class Action
Outcome Variables
(1)

(2)

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Last 1 Year

Underwriter’s
Counsel and Issuer’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Last 1 Year

0.0003
(0.0029)

0.0005
(0.002)

(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 40 IPO
deals

0.002
(0.004)

0.001
(0.003)

(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 80 IPO
deals

0.005
(0.005)

0.007
(0.004)

0.001
(0.003)

0.0002
(0.003)

(1) Preferred estimate – with standard controls (standard errors)
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number of
deals

Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar
marketshare
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar marketshare for IPOs in
preceding year
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs
in preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals
done
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year

-0.001
(0.003)

-0.0006
(0.002)

(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years

-0.002
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.002)

(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years

-0.002
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.002)

(9) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals;
n=384)

-0.0001
(0.003)

-0.0004
(0.002)

(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in
the dataset

0.005
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)

(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank
relationships

-0.001
(0.003)

0.001
(0.002)

(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since
founding

0.001
(0.003)

0.0002
(0.002)

(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding

0.001
(0.003)

0.0002
(0.002)

(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to
IPO

0.0005
(0.003)

0.0006
(0.002)

(17) IPO quarter instead of year

-0.002
(0.005)

0.004
(0.003)

(18) Removing the year 1999

0.001
(0.004)

0.003
(0.003)

(19) Removing the year 2000

0.0003
(0.003)

-0.004
(0.004)

Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms

Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer risk

Altering year controls

MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX

2015]

10/4/2015 11:48 AM

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN IPOs

163

Appendix Table 9:
Limiting to IOPs Managed by Largest Banks—
Underwriter & Underwriter’s Counsel
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
Deals Together
in the Past Year

(1)

(2)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.041*
(0.018)

Deals Together
in the Past 2
Years

(3)

(4)

0.019*
(0.008)

0.026*
(0.011)

Deals Together
in the Past 3
Years

(5)

(6)

0.013*
(0.0064)

0.019*
(0.008)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.049*
(0.019)

0.056**
(0.0212)

0.0487*
(0.0192)

0.055**
(0.0210)

0.0485*
(0.0191)

0.056**
(0.0211)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bank Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Manager>=40

X

Manager>=80

X
X

X
X

X

R2

0.328

0.325

0.328

0.322

0.326

0.321

Number of
Observations

1,534

940

1,534

940

1,534

940

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint
bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in such cases.
The table above reports the results of OLS regressions testing the possibility that selection is driving the observed increase in IPO
market performance in the periods studied. The table reports tests using the main specification for the opening day price jump and
repeated interactions between the Lead Underwriter and its counsel, but this time limiting the sample to banks that manage at least
40 issues in the dataset (the top 18 banks), and to banks that manage at least 80 issues in the dataset (the top 7 banks).
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Appendix Table 10:
Negative Disclosure
Panel A: Underwriter
& Underwriters’ Counsel
Dependent Variable: Proportion
of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
Deals Together in
Past 1 Year

(2)

(3)

0.309***
(0.057)

Deals Together in
Past 2 Years

0.200***
(0.040)

Deals Together in
Past 3 Years

0.150***
(0.035)

Industry Dummies

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

R2

0.166

0.166

0.164

Number of
Observations

2,247

2,247

2,247

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases.

Panel B: Underwriter’s Counsel
& Issuer’s Counsel
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
Deals Together in
Past 1 Year

(2)

(3)

0.190***
(0.043)

Deals Together in
Past 2 Years

0.173***
(0.031)

Deals Together in
Past 3 Years

0.151***
(0.024)

Industry Dummies

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

R

0.163

0.168

0.171

Number of
Observations

2,247

2,247

2,247

2

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases.
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Appendix Table 11:
Lawyer Experience on IPO Deals—
First Day Price Increase
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
Deals Done in
the Past Year

(1)

(2)

0.0048**
(0.0018)

0.0044
(0.0025)

Deals Done in
the Past 2 Years

(3)

(4)

0.0028*
(0.0011)

0.0027
(0.017)

Deals Done in
the Past 3 Years

(5)

(6)

0.0022**
(0.0009)

0.0023
(0.013)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.071***
(0.012)

0.103***
(0.015)

0.0720***
(0.0123)

0.056***
(0.0155)

0.0727***
(0.0123)

0.104***
(0.015)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry* Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

R2

0.22

0.35

0.22

0.35

0.22

0.35

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,719

2,725

2,719

2,725

2,719

Bank Counsel
Dummies

X

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and
0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
This table reports the results of OLS regressions testing whether the results in the main specification are driven by the law firm’s
level of recent experience (and thus are selection-driven). Law firm experience is measured by the number of IPOs done by a
particular law firm within the past 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years. The number of deals is a variable constructed by looking at the
number of IPOs done by the law firm in the relevant timespan prior to the offer date of every IPO that comprises an observation.
Industry and year-fixed effects, as well as a fixed effect for the interaction of year and industry, are used to isolate the effect of
lawyer experience regardless of industry and time period. As shown, the effect of law firm experience in the recent past
(accounting for industry and time period) is very small.
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Appendix Table 12:
Price Performance and Counsel Experience
(by Number of Recent Deals)
Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
(1)
Deals
Done in
Past Year

30-Day
(2)

(3)

0.0021
(0.0035)

Deals
Done in
Past 2
Years

(4)

60-Day
(5)

(6)

0.0090
(0.0060)

0.0014
(0.0024)

Deals
Done in
Past 3
Years

(7)

90-Day
(8)

(9)

0.0071
(0.006)

0.0054
(0.0038)

0.0021
(0.0018)

0.0055
(0.0042)

0.0054
(0.0029)

0.0053
(0.0033)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.31

0.30

0.31

0.271

0.27

0.27

2,719

2,719

2,719

2,715

2,715

2,715

2,714

2,714

2,714

Industry*
Year
Dummies
Bank
Counsel
Dummies
R2
Number of
Observations

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases.

